
Donald Trump’s recent battle with CNN, MS NOW, and Politico is just the latest in a long list of conflicts with the press over what he views as unfavorable or inaccurate coverage. Many people believe his actions are becoming increasingly authoritarian. Some are quick to reach for the term Nazi or fascist when describing his actions. I know this can be tempting because I’ve done it myself.
While his actions are becoming increasingly authoritarian-like, have they really reached the level of previous totalitarian dictatorships? Let’s look at a few totalitarian regimes from the last 100 years and see how the Trump administration’s approach to the press stacks up against theirs. While there are many examples to choose from, I’m going to look at two familiar and one not so familiar example — Nazi Germany, Communist China, and Viktor Orbán’s Hungary.
Nazi Germany
Prior to Hitler’s rise to power, Germany had a free and diverse press. In 1933 there were more than 4,700 newspapers in Germany covering almost every political, social and religious segment of society. Less than three percent of newspapers were controlled or heavily influenced by the Nazis.
Hitler rapidly seized control of the German press through a series of emergency decrees and laws he justified through a series of trumped-up events such as the infamous Reichstag fire. Hitler blamed the fire on the communists despite any clear evidence that they were involved.
Hitler also used it to justify mass arrests of political opponents and to issue emergency decrees suspending basic civil liberties and he made it illegal to criticize the government. Within just a few months, communist and social democratic newspapers had been shut down and their printing presses confiscated. Independent newspapers faced increasing pressure to comply “voluntarily” with government restrictions on their reporting.
In March 1933, the Nazis created the Reich Ministry of Public Enlightenment and Propaganda under Joseph Goebbels. He quickly took control of film, radio, theater, and newspapers. The Editor’s Law of October 1933 required every editor and journalist to register with the government. It excluded Jews and anyone married to a Jew, or anyone considered politically or racially unacceptable from taking part in either newspaper writing or publishing.
Editors were given specific instructions about what they would be allowed to report and how stories should be prepared. They were ordered to omit anything “calculated to weaken the strength of the Reich abroad or at home.” Acceptable content was provided through weekly press conferences in Berlin and was relayed to local newspapers. Those who didn’t comply could lose their jobs or even face the concentration camps. By the middle of 1941, the Nazis controlled approximately 80% of German newspapers. By the beginning of 1942, independent newspapers had virtually ceased to exist.
Communist China
China is an important example of media control in the digital age. They have found an effective way of controlling information in a society where almost everyone has a smartphone and almost anyone can post content.
China is not new to the game of media control. The Chinese Communist Party first established the Central Propaganda Department in 1921 and has been in total control of the country’s media since 1949. It found a way to effectively control a commercial media market by allowing some private ownership of closely controlled media companies.
What China has created is an effective system of self-censorship where media outlets employ their own in-house content managers who review all published items based on censorship guidelines from the Central Propaganda Department that are updated on a weekly basis. Publication rights can be granted, revoked, or restricted at the discretion of the party. There is no appeal of decisions.
The party has the “Great Firewall” that blocks foreign platforms and scrubs all sensitive topics from the Chinese internet. Websites can be blocked, social media posts removed, and accounts deleted. In 2016 Xiao Jinping stated, “all the work by the party’s media must reflect the party’s will, safeguard the party’s authority, and safeguard the party’s unity.”
According to nonprofit democracy watchdog groups, Freedom House, and The Committee to Protect Journalists, China has the world’s most restrictive media environment, and it is the world’s most aggressive jailer of journalists, holding at least 50 in prisons.
Hungary
Hungary is important to consider because it is a 21st century example of a state attempting to establish authoritative style control over national media. It’s equally important because it’s an example of an authoritative style government being voted out of office and actually leaving office.
Viktor Orbán used a strategy in Hungary this been referred to as “media capture”. He used organizations meant to provide oversight and protection for journalists and society at large and turned them into instruments of political influence; it’s the way he built and maintained his political power.
He cultivated friendly relationships with wealthy media owners, he made targeted advertising expenditures, and he exerted pressure on independent journalists. He assisted wealthy supporters in acquiring media organizations and provided them with favorable regulatory decisions. Without ever formally banning the opposition press, he wound up with indirect but nonetheless effective control of about 75% of the Hungarian media.
Orbán also worked tirelessly spreading propaganda through news outlets. His government regularly portrayed the opposition media as spreading false information and working for foreign governments. He seems to have a particular fascination with the Hungarian-born American businessman and philanthropist George Soros, something he shares with many American Republicans.
Media outlets that were favorable to Orbán enjoyed institutional and financial support. Critical organizations operated with greater difficulty. The combination of friendly ownership, public spending, and reduced regulatory authority gave an advantage to Orbán’s supporters. While Orbán made sure the competition was unequal, Hungary still retained some independent journalism as is evidenced by his recent election defeat.
How Trump Fits The Pattern
To be fair, I cannot say that Trump is completely replicating the authoritarian management of the press seen in countries such as Nazi Germany, fascist Italy, the Soviet Union, or modern authoritarian states. The legal, regulatory, and social environment in the United States makes that kind of overt government control of the press extremely difficult. But within the constraints of the American legal and political system, I believe Trump is applying some of the same principles wherever possible.
One example is his effort to control access to news events. The White House does not control reporters or what they write, but it has considerable control over who gets access to the president and his administration. It can influence who attends certain press events, who travels aboard Air Force One, and who receives interviews with the president, cabinet members, and other high-ranking officials. Privileged access is a powerful tool for rewarding friendly coverage and discouraging hostile reporting.
Trump has also benefited from the growing importance of friendly media ownership. Wealthy individuals and corporations increasingly control major news organizations, and their political and business interests can potentially influence editorial decisions. Jeff Bezos’s ownership of The Washington Post and the Ellison family’s influence over CBS and its corporate parent have raised questions about how ownership may affect coverage. An even more direct example is Truth Social, Trump’s preferred social-media platform, in whose parent company he holds a substantial financial interest.
Trump is also skilled at using delegitimizing language, a favorite tactic of authoritarian governments. Repeated attacks on journalists and news organizations can weaken the public’s willingness to defend an independent press. Trump’s frequent use of terms such as “fake news” and “the enemy of the American people” does not, by itself, facilitate the creation of an authoritarian program and rhetoric alone does not create a dictatorship. Historically, however, authoritarian movements have often attacked the credibility and legitimacy of the independent press before attempting to restrict its influence or bring it under greater control.
Perhaps the strongest parallel is the use—or threatened use—of government licensing, regulation, investigations, and litigation as instruments of pressure. Even when direct government action does not follow, repeated threats of lawsuits, license challenges, investigations, or adverse regulatory decisions can influence the behavior of media executives. Companies with billions of dollars at stake in mergers, licenses, acquisitions, and other government decisions may become more cautious about pursuing stories or commentary likely to antagonize the administration.
No single action constitutes government control of the press, and many individual actions may fall within existing law. But when media companies make concessions to the government while seeking favorable regulatory decisions, settling lawsuits, or protecting other corporate interests, the cumulative effect can be significant. Control of the press does not necessarily arrive through censorship laws or government seizure of newspapers and television stations. It can develop gradually, as economic pressure, political intimidation, restricted access, and regulatory uncertainty encourage media organizations to become increasingly cautious and compliant.
How He Doesn’t Fit
The most significant way Trump does not fit the traditional authoritarian pattern is legal. Authoritarian governments typically move quickly to suppress or abolish a free press, either by law or decree. In the United States, however, the First Amendment remains intact, and—for now—the courts continue to serve as an important check on presidential power. Numerous actions by the Trump administration have been challenged in court, and the administration does not have the legal authority simply to abolish freedom of the press. This is an essential distinction that cannot be ignored, even by those who are highly critical of Trump’s attempts to influence the news media.
There is also no equivalent in the United States to the systematic physical coercion employed by many authoritarian governments. Totalitarian regimes have imprisoned journalists, closed newspapers and broadcasting facilities, seized printing presses, and, in some cases, tolerated or encouraged violence against journalists. Whatever the seriousness of Trump’s attacks on the press, the United States has not reached that point.
Most authoritarian governments also attempt to establish centralized control over propaganda, censorship, and the distribution of information. The fragmented nature of the American media makes that extraordinarily difficult. Competing newspapers, television networks, radio stations, internet publications, podcasts, social media, and independent journalists provide Americans with an enormous variety of information. The ready availability of foreign news sources provides another safeguard against any government effort to monopolize information.
There is also an important difference in the speed and effectiveness of government action. Authoritarian regimes often move rapidly against an independent press. The Bolsheviks began closing opposition newspapers within days of taking power, while the Nazis largely brought the German press under their control within the first few years of Hitler’s rule. By contrast, Trump’s efforts to exert greater influence over the American media have encountered resistance from the courts, journalists, media organizations, political opponents, and civil society. The historical pattern of a rapid conquest of the press has not occurred in the United States, and it remains more of an ongoing contest.
Most importantly, Americans keep the ability to change their government through elections. Trump continues to have a substantial political base, but opposition parties and candidates remain free to organize, campaign, criticize the president, and compete for political power. As long as genuinely competitive elections, an independent judiciary, and constitutional protections for speech and the press remain intact, there are substantial barriers to comprehensive media control.
Where Do We Go From Here?
The more relevant comparison for the future may be not Nazi Germany or China, but Viktor Orbán’s Hungary, creating an American version of “media capture.”
The Trump administration may continue moving in that direction. It could place pressure on media owners through regulatory decisions, licensing disputes, government investigations, or the threat of litigation. Lawsuits and threatened lawsuits may also make media organizations more cautious about particularly aggressive coverage. Efforts to reduce or eliminate federal support for public broadcasting could further alter the media landscape.
Several potential developments deserve particularly close attention. Will the administration comply with adverse court rulings, or will it attempt to circumvent or delay them through prolonged litigation? Will the FCC use licensing or regulatory authority in ways that appear connected to the political content of news coverage? Will the Justice Department investigate or prosecute journalists for legitimate news gathering activities rather than for conduct involving clearly established violations of law? And will government power increasingly be used to reward friendly media organizations while imposing economic or regulatory costs on hostile ones?
These questions matter because authoritarian control of the press does not necessarily arrive in a single dramatic act. It can develop gradually as political leaders weaken independent institutions, intimidate critics, reward friendly owners, and make journalists increasingly cautious about challenging those in power.
For that reason, the most useful approach is neither to declare that the United States has already become an authoritarian state nor to assume that its constitutional protections make such a development impossible. It is better to watch what happens to the institutions that stand between political power and control of information: the courts, independent media organizations, regulatory agencies, opposition parties, and ultimately the electorate.
Trump’s relationship with the press clearly does not duplicate Hitler, Mussolini, Stalin, Mao, or Orbán. The question is whether the safeguards that distinguish the American system from those regimes remain strong enough to resist political pressure.
Illustration generated by author using ChatGPT
Sources
- Committee to Protect Journalists. “Alarm Bells: Trump’s First 100 Days Ramp Up Fear for the Press, Democracy.” May 12, 2025.
- Associated Press. “Paramount Settles with Trump for $16 Million over ’60 Minutes’ Interview.” July 2, 2025.
- Reuters. “Democratic FCC Commissioner Blasts Paramount Settlement with Trump as ‘Desperate’ Move.” July 2, 2025.
- Reuters. “CNN, MS NOW and Politico Sue Trump, Challenging White House Ban.” September 21, 2026.
- Reuters. “White House Media Ban Faces Long Odds in Court, Legal Experts Say.” September 22, 2026.
- Associated Press. “A White House Press Ban Was Lifted This Week. But the …” September 25, 2026.
- American Civil Liberties Union. “Trump’s Attacks on Press Freedom Escalate: NPR, PBS Funding Cuts Explained.” August 5, 2025.
- United States Holocaust Memorial Museum. “The Press in the Third Reich.” Holocaust Encyclopedia.
- United States Holocaust Memorial Museum. “Nazi Propaganda and Censorship.” Holocaust Encyclopedia.
- United States Holocaust Memorial Museum. “Editors Law.” Holocaust Encyclopedia.
- United States Holocaust Memorial Museum. “What Was Nazi Propaganda?”
- Council on Foreign Relations. “Media Censorship in China.”
- Freedom House. “China: Freedom in the World 2025 Country Report.”
- Freedom House. “China: Freedom on the Net 2025 Country Report.”
- U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission. Censorship Practices of the People’s Republic of China. Prepared by Exovera’s Center for Intelligence Research and Analysis. February 20, 2024.
- Committee to Protect Journalists. “2025 Journalist Jailings Remain Stubbornly High; Harsh Prison Conditions Pervasive.”










The Golden Age That Never Was
By John Turley
On July 14, 2026
In Commentary, History, Politics
How the Myth of 1950s America Is Being Weaponized by the Modern Right
Not long ago, I was sitting in a waiting room waiting to get an X-ray done. They had MeTV on the television and Leave It To Beaver was playing. You know, the classic 1950s television show where dad went to work, mom stayed at home and did housework while wearing pearls, a dress and heels, and the kids were well behaved even though they may occasionally have been “scamps”. Few ideas exert a stronger pull on the American imagination than the belief that there was once a lost golden age—a time when the nation was more prosperous, more moral, more unified, and more secure than it is today.
Ask most Americans when the country was at its best and there’s a decent chance you’ll hear something like: ” the ’50s.” Clean neighborhoods. Stable families. Everyone going to church on Sunday. One income paying the bills. It’s a seductive image and it’s one that right-wing politicians and evangelical leaders have been selling hard for decades. The only problem is that it was never the whole truth. In 2025, the effort to resurrect that selective memory began the move from campaign rhetoric into actual governance.
Let’s take a close look at the mythology of postwar America and examine what the 1940s and 1950s actually looked like for the millions of Americans excluded from the postcard image and explore how modern conservative politicians and religious leaders are drawing on that mythology to reshape the country today.
The Legend: America’s Postwar Paradise
It’s easy to understand the emotional pull. After the trauma of World War II and the deprivation of the Great Depression, the late 1940s and 1950s did, for a particular slice of America, offer something genuinely new: suburban homes, new cars, television sets, and a sense of safety and prosperity that earlier generations couldn’t have imagined. For white, middle-class families in the northern and midwestern United States, the GI Bill opened the door to homeownership and college education. Real wages rose. Life expectancy improved. The birth rate climbed.
Televisions went from being owned by 12 percent of households in 1950 to over 90 percent by the end of the decade and beamed idealized domestic life straight into living rooms across the country. Programs like Father Knows Best and, of course, Leave It to Beaver were essentially aspirational advertising. Nobody was poor. Nobody was Black. Nobody was gay. Nobody was confused. Everyone’s lawn was neatly trimmed and their problems resolved in 22 minutes.
It is worth acknowledging that aspects of this nostalgia reflect real experience for a limited few. The cultural stability and sense of community that many Americans remember from the era were genuine features of daily life for some people in some places. Writer Alan Ehrenhalt, who wrote extensively about 1950s Chicago neighborhoods, documented the authentic bonds people formed and the coherent community life that anchored their lives. The nostalgia is not entirely manufactured. But the question is: whose nostalgia counts, and who pays the price for making it policy?
The Reality Check: Who Got Left Out
Here is what the postcard left out: the United States of the 1950s was a country of legally enforced racial segregation, economic exclusion, and profound gender inequality. It was, in many respects, a country operating an unofficial domestic system of apartheid.
Jim Crow laws governed daily life for Black Americans from the post-Reconstruction era through the mid-1960s. Schools, workplaces, public transportation, medical facilities, and parks were racially segregated across the South and informally segregated in much of the North. Poll taxes and literacy tests suppressed Black voting. Vagrancy laws effectively criminalized unemployment among Black men. Physical terror, including lynching and the threat of violence, was used as a tool of social control.
Black Americans in the 1950s faced a starkly different economic reality than white Americans. Discriminatory lending practices, including the federally sanctioned “redlining” that denied mortgages to Black families in certain zip codes, locked millions out of the very suburban prosperity that defines the nostalgic image of the era. The GI Bill, widely celebrated as the engine of postwar middle-class expansion, was administered locally and largely excluded Black veterans in the South through discriminatory implementation.
Women fared little better by today’s standards. The idealization of the 1950s housewife conceals the coercive nature of women’s domestic confinement in that era. Women were largely excluded from professional careers, could not obtain credit cards in their own names until 1974, and faced deeply limited legal recourse against workplace discrimination or domestic violence. The image of the contented housewife was, for many women, less a personal choice than the only option available to them.
The economy itself was more volatile than the mythology suggests. The United States suffered four recessions between 1949 and 1960. Average GDP growth during the Eisenhower years ran at about 2.5 percent — respectable, but hardly the sustained boom of legend. And when measured by real GDP per capita in today’s dollars, the average American is roughly 3.7 times better off financially now than in 1955, which complicates the argument that things were economically superior back then.
The period was also marked by intense Cold War anxiety. Americans conducted nuclear attack drills in schools and lived with the constant fear of atomic war. I can remember the “duck and cover” drills that we had in school, as if hiding under our desk would protect us from a nuclear blast. The era also witnessed the rise of McCarthyism, during which accusations of communist sympathies, most without proof, damaged careers and chilled political dissent.
In this version of history, America was once united, moral, prosperous, and respected. Something then went wrong—often identified as secularization, feminism, immigration, globalization, civil rights activism, cultural liberalism, or government expansion. The nation’s challenges are therefore attributed not to complex economic and social forces but to a departure from traditional values.
Building the Myth: The Role of Religion and Cold War Politics
One of the most significant and least understood aspects of 1950s nostalgia is how deliberately constructed it was at the time. The “Christian America” that modern evangelical conservatives point to as a foundational model was, in large part, a Cold War invention.
Historian Kevin Kruse, in his book “One Nation Under God,” documents in detail how business, political, and religious leaders worked during the 1940s and 1950s to fuse Christianity with American national identity in an explicit effort to distinguish the United States from “godless communism.” The phrase “under God” was inserted into the Pledge of Allegiance in 1954 following a lobbying campaign by the Knights of Columbus. “In God We Trust” was adopted as the national motto in 1956, replacing the unofficial but far more pluralistic “E Pluribus Unum” — “Out of Many, One.” Both initiatives had the explicit goal of defining American identity through religious contrast with the Soviet Union, not of recovering some ancient tradition.
President Eisenhower was the central political figure in this fusion of piety and patriotism. Though he had little religious affiliation for most of his life, in 1953 he was baptized in the Presbyterian Church and became active in what historians called the “religious revival” of 1950s America. He signed the National Association of Evangelicals’ “Statement of Seven Divine Freedoms” in 1953 and became what many regarded as a symbolic pastor-in-chief. The Advertising Council ran a nationwide “Religion in American Life” campaign encouraging church attendance. Corporate America joined in: Walt Disney incorporated explicitly patriotic and religious themes into his Anaheim park. The annual National Prayer Breakfast was institutionalized. Presidential speeches began ending with “God bless America” as a matter of course.
Kruse is careful to note that this represented something genuinely new, not the recovery of something original. The “Christian founding” narrative so beloved by modern evangelical conservatives is, in his assessment, more myth than history. What the 1950s actually produced was a strategic civil religion built for Cold War propaganda — a useful fiction that has since been mistaken for ancient truth.
For many voters, such appeals are less about historical accuracy than emotional reassurance. They promise stability amid rapid change and offer a sense of continuity in a world that often feels uncertain.
The Political Machinery: From Reagan to MAGA
“Make America Great Again” is not, as many people assume, a phrase that originated with Donald Trump. Ronald Reagan used it extensively during his 1980 presidential campaign. Its emotional logic — that there was a better time, that it was taken from us, that we can return to it — has been a structural feature of American right-wing politics for at least four decades.
What Trump did was amplify it and make the temporal reference more explicit. When pressed, Trump has pointed to the late 1940s and 1950s as the era he has in mind as a model of national greatness. And his supporters appear to share that view. A 2024 survey by the Public Religion Research Institute (PRRI) found that approximately 70 percent of Republicans believe that America’s culture and way of life has changed for the worse since the 1950s.
That survey finding is worth thinking about. Seven in ten members of one of the nation’s two major political parties believe the country was better when segregation was legal, women couldn’t get a credit card, and McCarthyism was destroying careers on the basis of rumor and suspicion. The longing is, of course, more selective than that, most of those respondents are thinking of the community, stability, and cultural coherence of the era, not its injustices. But the political machinery that exploits that nostalgia does not make those fine distinctions.
Project 2025, the 900-page policy blueprint produced by the Heritage Foundation and dozens of allied conservative organizations, is perhaps the most systematic expression of this restorationist project. Its stated goals include restoring “the family as the centerpiece of American life,” reducing federal government size, centralizing executive power, and returning to what it calls “foundational values.” The document explicitly frames the current moment as a crisis requiring urgent corrective action to restore something that has been lost: a rhetorical structure that assumes the loss of a golden past as its premise.
The Evangelical Revival: Reclaiming a Nation That Never Quite Was
For evangelical Christians in the MAGA coalition, the 1950s hold special significance because of the Eisenhower-era fusion of Christianity and national identity. The addition of “under God” to the Pledge and “In God We Trust” to the currency are treated as evidence of a deep historical tradition — proof that America has “always” been a Christian nation. As one analysis published in Mere Orthodoxy noted, among proponents of Christian nationalism, there is broad agreement that “the cultural Christianity of the Eisenhower era presents a model to which we should aspire.”
The political ambitions of this movement are not subtle. During the first year of Trump’s second term, a series of executive orders moved explicitly toward institutionalizing evangelical Christian priorities within the federal government. One established a task force to “eradicate Christian bias” from government. Another created a White House Faith Office. A third established a Religious Liberty Commission. The rhetorical framing was consistently restorative — “bringing back” religion, returning to foundational truths, recovering what was lost.
What this narrative omits, as historians of religion have carefully documented, is that the “Christian America” of the 1950s was itself a political construction, not an inherited tradition. The founders were, at best, a religiously mixed group whose Enlightenment-influenced constitutional framework was deliberately secular. As Americans United for Separation of Church and State ha noted, the Cold War-era religious symbols that Christian nationalists now treat as bedrock tradition would have been unfamiliar and to the actual founders.
The 1950s that evangelicals and Christian nationalists embrace as a Christian model was also the decade that ended with Supreme Court rulings in 1962 and 1963 prohibiting sponsored prayer and Bible reading in public schools. From the Christian nationalist perspective, those rulings mark the beginning of America’s moral decline. Which means the golden age they want to restore existed for, at most, a few years before it was, by their own account, already being dismantled.
Nostalgia as a Political Tool: The Psychology Behind the Appeal
None of this is to say that nostalgia is inherently dishonest or manipulative. Research in psychology consistently shows that people misremember the past by emphasizing positive personal experiences and filtering out context that complicates the picture. This is normal human cognition, not bad faith. For working-class white Americans who experienced the 1950s as a period of genuine stability and upward mobility, the memory is not false. The problem arises when personal memory is converted into universal history and then into policy prescription.
Political movements have always understood the emotional power of a remembered golden age. The appeal to restoration allows politicians to diagnose the present as fallen and to promise recovery without having to specify precisely what they’re recovering. It is a rhetorically flexible tool: it can mean lower taxes, stronger churches, tougher borders, whiter neighborhoods, or simply the vague sense that things made more sense once and someone took them away from you. The ambiguity is a feature, not a bug. It allows a coalition of people with different specific grievances to unite around a shared emotional posture.
What makes the current moment distinctive is the ambition and specificity of the institutional project. Earlier iterations of “Make America Great Again” were largely rhetorical. Project 2025, Christian nationalism’s White House offices, and the executive order campaign of Trump’s second term represent an attempt to translate nostalgic sentiment into durable structural change. The mythology is no longer just a campaign slogan. It is becoming, or attempting to become, a governing framework.
What Gets Left Out When We Go Back
The practical consequences of any serious attempt to restore something like 1950s governance deserve direct examination. The America of that era did not inadvertently exclude Black citizens, women, LGBTQ+ Americans, and religious minorities from full participation in public life. It excluded them by law and by deliberate institutional design. Any genuine “return” to the social order of that era would require actively undoing the legal and social progress of the intervening seven decades.
Some elements of the contemporary right’s agenda move explicitly in that direction: challenges to voting rights provisions, rollbacks of civil rights protections for LGBTQ+ Americans, attacks on DEI programs, restrictions on reproductive autonomy, and pressure on the constitutional separation of church and state. Whether these specific policies will achieve their stated goals is a matter of legitimate political debate. But the historical record of the 1950s for the Americans who were not white, male, heterosexual, and Protestant is not ambiguous. For them it was not a golden age, not even close.
Perhaps the most honest thing one can say about the 1950s is what the historical record shows: it was a complex, contradictory decade. For some Americans, it genuinely offered stability, community, and opportunity. For others, it was a system of legal oppression maintained by violence and economic exclusion. Both things are true. A serious engagement with the era requires recognizing that contradiction. A political mythology that acknowledges only one of those truths is not history. It is propaganda.
A Final Thought
The golden age of America is a powerful story. It has the great advantage of being partly true — enough to feel authentic to those who experienced it, enough to resonate with people who wish the present were simpler and more coherent. But it is a partial truth that has been shaped, amplified, and in some cases invented to serve political ends. The religious symbolism of the Eisenhower era was a Cold War construction, not an ancient tradition. The prosperity of the postwar years was real for some but radically unequal. The community stability that people remember was purchased, in part, through the enforced subordination of millions of Americans.
Understanding all of this doesn’t require abandoning the genuine good things of that era — community, stability, the importance of family and neighborhood. It requires being honest about the terms on which those good things were available and for whom. And it requires asking whether the politicians and religious leaders invoking that era’s memory are interested in what made it work for many Americans and extending those benefits to everyone, or whether they are more interested in what made it work specifically for white, Christian, heterosexual men.
History does not go backward. But it can be selectively remembered in ways that carry serious consequences for the present. That is worth thinking carefully about.
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