
The story of the Hamilton-Burr duel has all the elements of a Greek tragedy: brilliant men, political ambition, an unforgiving honor culture, and an ending that destroyed both victor and vanquished alike. When Aaron Burr shot Alexander Hamilton on the morning of July 11, 1804, he didn’t just kill one of America’s founding architects—he also ended his own political career and helped doom the entire Federalist Party to irrelevance. Let’s rewind the clock more than a decade to try and understand how these two gifted lawyers and Revolutionary War veterans ended up facing each other with loaded pistols.
The Long Road to Weehawken
Hamilton and Burr moved in the same elite New York political circles from the 1790s onward, but they had remarkably different temperaments and political beliefs. Hamilton was ideological, prolific, and combative—often too much so for his own good. Burr was pragmatic, opaque, self-serving, and famously hard to pin down on principle. They distrusted each other deeply.
Their rivalry stretched back to 1791, when Burr defeated Philip Schuyler for a U.S. Senate seat representing New York. This wasn’t just any political defeat for Hamilton—Schuyler was his father-in-law and a crucial Federalist ally on whom Hamilton had counted to support his ambitious financial programs. Hamilton, who was serving in George Washington’s cabinet as Treasury Secretary, never forgave Burr for this loss. In correspondence from June 1804, Hamilton himself referenced “a course of fifteen years competition” between the two men.
Their philosophical differences ran deep. Hamilton was an ideological Federalist who dreamed of transforming the United States into a modern economic power rivaling European empires through strong central government, industrial development, and military strength. Burr, by contrast, approached politics more pragmatically—he saw it as a vehicle for advancing his own interests and those of his allies rather than as a way to implement sweeping political visions. As Burr himself allegedly said, politics were nothing more than “fun and honor and profit”. Hamilton viewed Burr as fundamentally dangerous due to his lack of fixed ideological principles. Hamilton wrote in 1792 that he considered it his “religious duty to keep this man from office”
The election of 1800 brought their animosity to a boiling point. Due to a quirk in the original Constitution’s electoral system, Thomas Jefferson and his running mate Aaron Burr tied in the Electoral College with 73 votes each, allowing the Federalists to briefly consider elevating Burr to the presidency. The decision went to the House of Representatives, and Hamilton—despite despising Jefferson’s Democratic-Republican politics—campaigned hard to ensure Jefferson won the presidency rather than Burr. Hamilton argued that Jefferson, however wrong in policy, had convictions, whereas Burr had none. In the end, Jefferson gained the presidency and Burr became Vice President, but their relationship was never collegial and Burr was excluded from any meaningful participation in Jefferson’s administration.
By 1804, it was clear Jefferson would not consider Burr for a second term as Vice President. Desperate to salvage his political career, Burr made a surprising move: he sought the Federalist nomination for governor of New York, switching from his Democratic-Republican affiliation. It was a strange gambit—essentially betting that his political enemies might support him if it served their interests. Hamilton, predictably, worked vigorously to block Burr’s ambitions yet again. Although Hamilton’s opposition wasn’t the only factor, Burr lost badly to Morgan Lewis, the Democratic-Republican candidate, in April 1804.
The Cooper Letter and the Challenge
The immediate trigger for the duel came from a relatively minor slight in the context of their long feud. In February 1804, Dr. Charles Cooper attended a dinner party where Hamilton spoke forcefully against Burr’s candidacy. Cooper later wrote to Philip Schuyler describing Hamilton’s comments, noting that Hamilton had called Burr “a dangerous man” and referenced an even “more despicable opinion” of him. This letter was published in the Albany Register in April, after Burr’s electoral defeat.
When the newspaper reached Burr, he was already politically ruined—still Vice President of the United States, but with no prospects for future office. He demanded that Hamilton acknowledge or deny the statements attributed to him. What followed was a formal exchange of letters between the two men and their representatives that lasted through June. Hamilton refused to give Burr the straightforward denial he sought, explaining that he couldn’t reasonably be expected to account for everything he might have said about a political opponent during fifteen years of competition. Burr, seeing his honor impugned and his options exhausted, invoked the code of honor and issued a formal challenge to duel.
Hamilton found himself in an impossible position. If he admitted to the insults, which were substantially true, he would lose his honor. If he refused to duel, the result would be the same—his political career would effectively end. Hamilton had personal and moral objections to dueling. His eldest son Philip had died in a duel just three years earlier, at the same Weehawken location where Hamilton and Burr would meet. Hamilton calculated that his ability to maintain his political influence required him to conform to the codes of honor that governed gentlemen’s behavior in early America.
Dawn at Weehawken
At 5:00 AM on the morning of July 11, 1804, the men departed Manhattan from separate docks. They were each rowed across the Hudson River to the Heights of Weehawken, New Jersey—a popular dueling ground where at least 18 known duels took place between 1700 and 1845. They chose New Jersey because while dueling had been outlawed in both New York and New Jersey, the New Jersey penalties were less severe.
Burr arrived first around 6:30 AM, with Hamilton landing about thirty minutes later. Each man was accompanied by his “second”—an assistant responsible for ensuring the duel followed proper protocols. Hamilton brought Nathaniel Pendleton, a Revolutionary War veteran and Georgia district court judge, while Burr’s second was William Van Ness, a New York federal judge. Hamilton also brought Dr. David Hosack, a Columbia College professor of medicine and botany, in case medical attention proved necessary.
Shortly after 7 a.m., the seconds measured out ten paces, loaded the .56‑caliber pistols, and explained the firing rules before Hamilton and Burr took their positions. What exactly happened next remains one of history’s enduring mysteries. The seconds gave conflicting accounts, and historians still debate the sequence and meaning of events.

In a written statement before the duel, Hamilton expressed religious and moral objections to dueling, worry for his family and creditors, and professed no personal hatred of Burr, yet concluded that honor and future public usefulness compelled him to accept. By some accounts, Hamilton had also written to confidants indicating his intention to “throw away my shot”—essentially to deliberately miss Burr, satisfying the requirements of honor without attempting to kill his opponent. Burr, by contrast, appears to have aimed directly at Hamilton.
Some accounts suggest Hamilton fired first, with his shot hitting a tree branch above and behind Burr’s head. Other versions claim Burr shot first. There’s even a theory that Hamilton’s pistol had a hair trigger that caused an accidental discharge after Burr wounded him.
What’s undisputed is the outcome: Burr’s shot struck Hamilton in the lower abdomen, with the bullet lodging near his spine. Hamilton fell, and Burr reportedly started toward his fallen opponent before Van Ness held him back, worried about the legal consequences of lingering at the scene. The two parties crossed back to Manhattan in their respective boats, with Hamilton taken to the home of William Bayard Jr. in what is now Greenwich Village.
Hamilton survived long enough to say goodbye to his wife Eliza and their children. He died at 2 PM on July 12, 1804, approximately 31 hours after being shot.
Political Aftershocks
The nation was outraged. While duels were relatively common in early America, they rarely resulted in death, and the killing of someone as prominent as Alexander Hamilton sparked widespread condemnation. The political consequences proved catastrophic for everyone involved—and reshaped American politics for the next two decades.
Hamilton’s death turned him into a Federalist martyr. Even many who had disliked his arrogance now praised his intellect, service, and sacrifice. His economic vision, already embedded in American institutions, gained a kind of posthumous authority.
For Aaron Burr, the duel destroyed him politically and socially. Murder charges were filed against him in both New York and New Jersey, though neither reached trial—a grand jury in Bergen County, New Jersey indicted him for murder in November 1804, but the New Jersey Supreme Court quashed the indictment. Nevertheless, Burr fled to St. Simons Island, Georgia, staying at the plantation of Pierce Butler, before returning to Washington to complete his term as Vice President.
Rather than restoring his reputation as he’d hoped, the duel made Burr a pariah. He would never hold elected office again. His subsequent attempt to regain power through what historians call the “Burr Conspiracy”—an alleged plan to create an independent nation along the Mississippi River by separating territories from the United States and Spain—led to a treason trial in 1807. Chief Justice John Marshall presided and Burr was ultimately acquitted, but the trial further cemented Burr’s reputation as a dangerous schemer. He spent his later years quietly practicing law in New York.
For the Federalist Party, Hamilton’s death proved even more devastating than Burr’s personal ruin. Hamilton had been the party’s intellectual architect and most effective leader. At the time of his death, the Federalists were attempting a comeback after their national defeat in the 1800 election. Without Hamilton’s energy, strategic thinking, and ability to articulate a compelling vision for the country, the Federalists lost direction. As one historian put it, “The Federalists would be unable to find another leader as forceful and energetic as Hamilton had been, and their movement would slowly suffocate before finally petering out in the early 1820s”. The party’s decline ended what historians consider the first round of partisan struggles in American history.
An interesting footnote: while many Federalists wanted to portray Hamilton as a political martyr, Federalist clergy broke with the party line to condemn dueling itself as a violation of the sixth commandment. These ministers used Hamilton’s death as an opportunity to wage a moral crusade against the practice of dueling, helping to accelerate its decline in American culture—particularly in the northern states where it was already losing favor.
The duel produced a triple tragedy: Hamilton dead at age 47 (or 49—his birth year remains disputed), Burr politically destroyed despite being acquitted of murder charges, and the Federalist Party fatally weakened at a critical moment in American political development.
The Hamilton–Burr duel sits at the intersection of politics, personality, and culture. It reminds us that the early republic was not a calm, rational experiment run by marble statues—but a volatile environment shaped by ego, fear, and ambition. Institutions were young, norms were fragile, and reputations were all important. What began as fifteen years of professional rivalry and personal enmity ended with two brilliant men eliminating each other from the political stage, neither achieving what they’d hoped for through their fatal meeting on the heights of Weehawken.
Sources
Encyclopedia Britannica “Burr-Hamilton duel | Summary, Background, & Facts” https://www.britannica.com/event/Burr-Hamilton-duel
History.com “Aaron Burr slays Alexander Hamilton in duel” https://www.history.com/this-day-in-history/july-11/burr-slays-hamilton-in-duel
Library of Congress “Today in History – July 11” https://www.loc.gov/item/today-in-history/july-11
National Constitution Center “The Burr vs. Hamilton duel happened on this day” https://constitutioncenter.org/blog/burr-vs-hamilton-behind-the-ultimate-political-feud
National Park Service “Hamilton-Burr Duel” https://www.nps.gov/articles/000/hamilton-burr-duel.htm
PBS American Experience “Alexander Hamilton and Aaron Burr’s Duel” https://www.pbs.org/wgbh/americanexperience/features/duel-alexander-hamilton-and-aaron-burrs-duel/
The Gospel Coalition “American Prophets: Federalist Clergy’s Response to the Hamilton–Burr Duel of 1804” https://www.thegospelcoalition.org/themelios/article/american-prophets-federalist-clergys-response-to-the-hamilton-burr-duel-of-1804/
Wikipedia “Burr–Hamilton duel” https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Burr–Hamilton_duel
World History Encyclopedia “Hamilton-Burr Duel” https://www.worldhistory.org/article/2548/hamilton-burr-duel/
For more information about the history of dueling in early America see my earlier post: Pistols at Dawn, The Rise and Fall of the Code Duello.
Images generated by author using ChatGPT.












When They Knew: How the Fossil Fuel Industry Buried Its Own Climate Science
By John Turley
On February 9, 2026
In Commentary, Politics
The story begins not with climate deniers casting doubt on new science, but with something far more troubling: companies conducting rigorous research, understanding exactly what their products would do to the planet, and then spending decades lying to the public. They treated science as an internal planning tool and then deployed public relations, front groups, and “manufactured doubt” to delay regulation and protect profits.
The Oil Industry’s Own Scientists Saw It Coming
In 1977, a scientist named James Black stood before Exxon’s management committee with an uncomfortable message. According to internal documents later uncovered by investigative journalists, Black told executives that burning fossil fuels was increasing atmospheric carbon dioxide, and that continually rising CO2 levels would increase global temperatures by two to three degrees—a projection that is still consistent with today’s scientific consensus. He warned that we had a window of just five to ten years before “hard decisions regarding changes in energy strategies might become critical”.
What happened next is remarkable for its precision. Throughout the late 1970s and 1980s, Exxon assembled what one scientist called “a credible scientific team” to investigate the climate question. They launched ambitious projects, including outfitting a supertanker with custom instruments to measure how oceans absorbed CO2—one of the most pressing scientific questions of the era. A 2023 Harvard study analyzing Exxon’s internal climate projections from 1977 to 2003 found they predicted global warming with what researchers called “shocking skill and accuracy.” Specifically, the company projected 0.20 degrees Centigrade of warming per decade, with a margin of error of just 0.04 degrees—a forecast that has proven largely correct.
Exxon wasn’t alone. Shell produced a confidential 1988 report titled “The Greenhouse Effect” that warned of climate changes “larger than any that have occurred over the last 12,000 years,” including destructive floods and mass migrations. The report revealed Shell had been running an internal climate science program since 1981. In one striking document from 1986, Shell predicted that fossil fuel emissions would cause changes “the greatest in recorded history”.
Even industry groups understood what was coming. In 1980, the American Petroleum Institute (API) invited Stanford scientist John Laurmann to brief oil company representatives at its secret “CO2 and Climate Task Force”. His presentation, now public, warned that continued fossil fuel use would be “barely noticeable” by 2005 but by the 2060s would have “globally catastrophic effects.” That same year, the API called on governments to triple coal production worldwide, publicly insisting there would be no negative consequences.
The Coal Industry Knew Even Earlier
If anything, the coal industry understood the problem first. A 1966 article in the trade publication Mining Congress Journal by James Garvey, president of Bituminous Coal Research Inc., explicitly discussed how continued coal consumption would increase atmospheric temperatures and cause “vast changes in the climates of the earth.” A combustion engineer from Peabody Coal, now the world’s largest coal company, acknowledged in the same publication that the industry was “buying time” before air pollution regulations would force action.
This 1966 evidence is particularly damning because it predates widespread public awareness by decades. The coal industry didn’t stumble into climate denial—they entered it with full knowledge of what they were obscuring.
Major coal interests also had early awareness that carbon emissions posed regulatory and market risks, particularly for coal‑fired electricity, and they participated in joint industry research and strategy discussions about climate change in the 1980s and 1990s. At the same time, coal associations helped create public campaigns such as the Information Council for the Environment (ICE—even then a disturbing acronym), whose internal planning documents explicitly set an objective to “reposition global warming as theory (not fact)” and to target specific demographic groups with tailored doubt‑based messages.
According to a report from the Union of Concerned Scientists, these efforts often relied on “grassroots” fronts, advertising, and even forged constituent letters to legislators to undermine support for climate policy and to counter the conclusions of mainstream climate science, which even the companies’ own experts did not refute.
What They Said Publicly
The contrast between private knowledge and public statements is stark. While Exxon scientists were building sophisticated climate models internally, the company’s public messaging emphasized uncertainty. In a 1997 speech, Exxon CEO Lee Raymond told an audience at the World Petroleum Conference: “Let’s agree there’s a lot we really don’t know about how climate change will change in the 21st century and beyond”. They spread messaging that emphasized uncertainty, framed global warming as just a “theory,” and highlighted supposed flaws in climate models, even as their own scientists were using those models to make precise projections. The company and allied trade associations supported think tanks and advocacy groups such as Citizens For Sound Science, that questioned if human activity was responsible for warming and opposed binding limits on emissions, producing a stark discrepancy between internal scientific knowledge and external communication.
In 1989, Exxon helped create the Global Climate Coalition—despite its environmental sounding name, the organization worked to cast doubt on climate science and block clean energy legislation throughout the 1990s. Electric utilities and coal‑linked organizations joined this coalition to systematically attack climate scientists and lobby to weaken or stall international agreements like the Kyoto Protocol, despite internal recognition that greenhouse gases were driving warming.
Internal API documents from a 1998 meeting reveal an explicit strategy to “ensure that a majority of the American public… recognizes that significant uncertainties exist in climate science”.
In 1991, Shell produced a film, “Climate of Concern,” which stated that human driven—as opposed to greenhouse gas driven—climate change was happening “at a rate faster than at any time since the end of the ice age” and warned of extreme weather, flooding, famine, and climate refugees. They understood the science but tried to shift the blame.
According to a 2013 Drexel University study, between 2003 and 2010 alone, approximately $558 million was distributed to about 100 climate change denial organizations. Greenpeace reports that Exxon alone spent more than $30 million on think tanks promoting climate denial.
The Tobacco Playbook
The parallels to Big Tobacco’s strategy are not coincidental—they’re intentional. Research by the Center for International Environmental Law uncovered more than 100 documents from the Tobacco Industry Archives showing that oil and tobacco companies not only used the same PR firms and research institutes, but often the same individual researchers. The connection goes back to at least the 1950s. A report published in Scientific American suggests the oil and tobacco industries both hired the PR firm Hill & Knowlton Inc. as early as 1956.
A 1969 internal memo from R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Company stated plainly: “Doubt is our product since it is the best means of competing with the ‘body of fact’ that exists in the mind of the general public”. This became the template. Create uncertainty. Emphasize what isn’t known rather than what is. Fund research that casts doubt. Attack the credibility of independent scientists. They formed organizations with scientific-sounding names that existed primarily to muddy the waters.
In one particularly brazen example, a 2015 presentation by Cloud Peak Energy executive Richard Reavey titled “Survival Is Victory: Lessons From the Tobacco Wars,” explicitly coached coal executives on how to apply tobacco industry tactics.
What makes the fossil fuel case particularly egregious is the temporal dimension. These weren’t companies caught off-guard by emerging science. They funded the research. They understood the findings. Their own scientists urged action. A 1978 Exxon memo noted this could be “the kind of opportunity we are looking for to have Exxon technology, management and leadership resources put into the context of a project aimed at benefitting mankind”.
Instead, when oil prices collapsed in the mid-1980s, Exxon pivoted from conducting climate research to funding climate denial. By the late 1980s, according to reporting by InsideClimate News, Exxon “curtailed its carbon dioxide research” and “worked instead at the forefront of climate denial”.
Where We Stand Now
Across the oil, gas, and coal industries, there is not a genuine scientific dispute inside companies but a divergence between what in‑house experts knew and what corporate leaders chose to communicate to the public and policymakers. This divergence mirrors the tobacco industry’s long‑running use of organized doubt. In both arenas, industry actors treated early recognition of harm as a legal and political threat and responded by investing in campaigns to confuse, delay, and reframe the science rather than addressing the risks their own research had identified.
The evidence trail has led to legal action. More than 20 cities, counties, and states have filed lawsuits against fossil fuel companies for damages caused by climate change, arguing the industry knowingly deceived the public. The European Parliament held hearings in 2019 on climate denial by ExxonMobil and other actors. The hashtags #ExxonKnew, #ShellKnew, and #TotalKnew have become rallying cries for accountability.
Senator Sheldon Whitehouse has explicitly compared the fossil fuel industry’s actions to the tobacco racketeering case that ultimately held cigarette makers accountable. As he noted in a Senate speech, the elements of a civil racketeering case are straightforward: defendants conducted an enterprise with a pattern of racketeering activity.
The difference between the tobacco and fossil fuel cases may be one of scale. As researchers Naomi Oreskes and Erik Conway documented in their book Merchants of Doubt, both industries worked to obscure truth for profit. But while tobacco kills individuals, climate change threatens entire ecosystems and future generations. The time to act is now.
Sources:
Scientific American – “Exxon Knew about Climate Change Almost 40 Years Ago”
https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/exxon-knew-about-climate-change-almost-40-years-ago/
Harvard Gazette – Harvard-led analysis finds ExxonMobil internal research accurately predicted climate change
https://news.harvard.edu/gazette/story/2023/01/harvard-led-analysis-finds-exxonmobil-internal-research-accurately-predicted-climate-change/
InsideClimate News – Exxon’s Own Research Confirmed Fossil Fuels’ Role in Global Warming Decades Ago
https://insideclimatenews.org/news/02052024/from-the-archive-exxon-research-global-warming/
PBS Frontline – Investigation Finds Exxon Ignored Its Own Early Climate Change Warnings
https://www.pbs.org/wgbh/frontline/article/investigation-finds-exxon-ignored-its-own-early-climate-change-warnings/
NPR – Exxon climate predictions were accurate decades ago. Still it sowed doubt
https://www.npr.org/2023/01/12/1148376084/exxon-climate-predictions-were-accurate-decades-ago-still-it-sowed-doubt
Science (journal) – Assessing ExxonMobil’s global warming projections
https://www.science.org/doi/10.1126/science.abk0063
Climate Investigations Center – Shell Climate Documents
https://climateinvestigations.org/shell-oil-climate-documents/
The Conversation – What Big Oil knew about climate change, in its own words
https://theconversation.com/what-big-oil-knew-about-climate-change-in-its-own-words-170642
ScienceAlert – The Coal Industry Was Well Aware of Climate Change Predictions Over 50 Years Ago
https://www.sciencealert.com/coal-industry-knew-about-climate-change-in-the-60s-damning-revelations-show
The Intercept – A Major Coal Company Went Bust. Its Bankruptcy Filing Shows That It Was Funding Climate Change Denialism
https://theintercept.com/2019/05/16/coal-industry-climate-change-denial-cloud-peak-energy/
Center for International Environmental Law – Big Oil Denial Playbook Revealed by New Documents
https://www.ciel.org/news/oil-tobacco-denial-playbook/
Wikipedia – Tobacco industry playbook
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Tobacco_industry_playbook
Scientific American – Tobacco and Oil Industries Used Same Researchers to Sway Public
https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/tobacco-and-oil-industries-used-same-researchers-to-sway-public1/
Environmental Health (journal) – The science of spin: targeted strategies to manufacture doubt with detrimental effects on environmental and public health
https://link.springer.com/article/10.1186/s12940-021-00723-0
Senator Sheldon Whitehouse – Time to Wake Up: Climate Denial Recalls Tobacco Racketeering
https://www.whitehouse.senate.gov/news/speeches/time-to-wake-up-climate-denial-recalls-tobacco-racketeering/
VICE News – Meet the ‘Merchants of Doubt’ Who Sow Confusion about Tobacco Smoke and Climate Change
https://www.vice.com/en/article/meet-the-merchants-of-doubt-who-sow-confusion-about-tobacco-smoke-and-climate-change/
Union of Concerned Scientists – The Climate Deception Dossiers
https://www.ucs.org/sites/default/files/attach/2015/07/The-Climate-Deception-Dossiers.pdf
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