Tag: Constitution

America’s First Constitution

On June 26, 2026

The Articles of Confederation: Birth, Failures, and Legacy

The United States Constitution, ratified in 1788 and implemented in 1789, is often treated as the nation’s true founding framework. Yet before it, there existed another governing document, one far less celebrated but no less essential to understanding the early republic. The Articles of Confederation and Perpetual Union served as America’s first constitution from their adoption by the Continental Congress in 1777 to their replacement just over a decade later. Imperfect, fragile, and ultimately unsustainable, the Articles nevertheless provided the institutional bridge between revolution and nationhood.

To understand why the Articles were structured as they were—and why they ultimately failed we need to step back into the mindset of the revolutionary generation. The men who drafted them were not political theorists operating in calm conditions; they were wartime leaders grappling with uncertainty, scarcity, and deep suspicion of centralized authority. They had just rebelled against British tyranny, and they were determined not to allow such power on American soil. The result was a system deliberately designed to restrain national authority, even at the cost of efficiency. The Articles represented both a solution to immediate wartime needs and a reflection of deeply held ideological fears. Their story is not merely one of failure, but of experimentation, adaptation, and political learning.

Revolutionary Context and the Need for Union

The intellectual origins of the Articles stretch back well before independence. Colonial leaders had long recognized the potential benefits of intercolonial cooperation. Benjamin Franklin’s Albany Plan of Union in 1754 proposed a centralized colonial government capable of coordinating defense and managing relations with Native nations. Though ultimately rejected by the colonies, the plan foreshadowed later efforts at union by raising the fundamental question of how semi-autonomous political entities might cooperate without surrendering their independence.

That question became urgent during the American Revolution. When the Second Continental Congress convened in 1775, it functioned as a provisional government, but its authority was ambiguous and largely dependent on voluntary compliance. As the war intensified, it became increasingly clear that thirteen separate colonies could not effectively wage a coordinated struggle against the British Empire without some formal political structure. Congress needed legitimacy—not merely as a gathering of delegates, but as a governing body with recognized authority over military, diplomatic, and financial matters.

On June 11, 1776, Congress appointed a committee to draft a plan of confederation, even as another committee worked on the Declaration of Independence. The parallel timing was no coincidence. Independence required not only separation from Britain but also the creation of a new political order. The Articles were intended to provide that order, a framework through which the states could act collectively while preserving their individual sovereignty.

Drafting Under Pressure

The drafting process unfolded under extraordinary circumstances. John Dickinson of Pennsylvania, a respected lawyer and political thinker, chaired the committee and produced the initial draft in July 1776. Debate over its provisions, however, proved slow and contentious. Congress was simultaneously managing a war, and immediate military concerns often took precedence over constitutional deliberation.

Disagreements over representation, taxation, and western land claims delayed progress for more than a year. It was not until November 15, 1777, while Congress was in exile in York, Pennsylvania, following the British capture of Philadelphia, that the Articles were finally approved. Even then, the document was widely understood as a compromise rather than an ideal solution.

Ratification presented an additional challenge. Because the Articles required unanimous consent, any single state could delay their implementation. The principal obstacle came from disputes over western lands. States with expansive territorial claims, such as Virginia, were reluctant to relinquish them, while smaller states like Maryland insisted that such lands should be held in common for the benefit of the union. Only after Virginia agreed to cede its claims did Maryland ratify the Articles on March 1, 1781, bringing them into full effect.

Structure and Principles

The Articles of Confederation established a national government that was intentionally limited in scope. At its core was a unicameral Congress in which each state, regardless of size or population, held a single vote. This arrangement reflected the primacy of state sovereignty: the union was conceived not as a single nation but as a “league of friendship” among independent states.

The national government possessed certain powers, including the authority to declare war, negotiate treaties, coin money, and manage relations with Native nations. However, these powers were constrained by critical limitations. Congress could not levy taxes directly, regulate interstate commerce, or enforce its decisions upon the states. Instead, it relied on requisitions, little more than requests for funds, which states frequently ignored or, at best, only partially fulfilled.

Equally significant was the absence of both an executive branch and a national judiciary. There was no president to enforce laws or coordinate policy, and no federal court system to interpret them. Administrative functions were handled by committees and departments accountable to Congress, resulting in a diffuse and often ineffective system of governance.

Amending the Articles required unanimous consent, a provision that made meaningful reform nearly impossible. While intended to protect state sovereignty, this requirement ensured that structural weaknesses could not be easily corrected.

Achievements Under the Articles

Despite their limitations, the Articles of Confederation were not without success. Most importantly, they provided a legal framework that enabled the colonies to prosecute and ultimately win the Revolutionary War. The Continental Congress, operating under the authority of the Articles, secured crucial alliances, most notably with France, and negotiated the Treaty of Paris in 1783, which formally ended the conflict and recognized American independence.

The Confederation government also achieved lasting success in western land policy. The Land Ordinances of 1784 and 1785, followed by the Northwest Ordinance of 1787, established a systematic process for surveying, selling, and governing western territories. These measures ensured that new states would enter the union on equal footing with the original thirteen and prohibited slavery in the Northwest Territory. This framework not only facilitated orderly expansion but also set important precedents for federal authority over territories.

The Articles also fostered a sense of national identity, however fragile. They affirmed the name “United States of America” and maintained a formal union during a period when regional differences might easily have led to fragmentation.

Structural Weaknesses and Growing Crisis

The weaknesses of the Articles, however, became increasingly apparent in the postwar period. Financial instability was among the most pressing issues. Without the power to tax, Congress struggled to pay war debts, fund the military, or support basic governmental functions. Inflation, currency devaluation, and economic dislocation further compounded these difficulties.

Interstate economic conflict added another layer of instability. In the absence of federal regulation, states imposed tariffs and trade barriers against one another, undermining economic cohesion. Competing currencies and inconsistent policies created an environment of uncertainty that hindered recovery and growth.

The lack of enforcement mechanisms proved equally problematic. Congress could pass laws and enter into treaties, but it had no means of compelling compliance. States frequently ignored national directives, and often violated provisions of the Treaty of Paris, particularly regarding the treatment of loyalists and British creditors. This inability to enforce national policy damaged American credibility abroad.

These structural deficiencies reflected the underlying philosophy of the Articles: a deep distrust of centralized power. By the mid-1780s, it was becoming clear that excessive decentralization carried its own dangers.

Shays’ Rebellion and the Turning Point

The crisis reached a breaking point with Shays’ Rebellion in 1786–1787. Economic hardship, particularly among farmers in western Massachusetts, led to widespread unrest. Burdened by debt and high taxes, many farmers faced foreclosure and imprisonment. When legal and political remedies failed, they turned to direct action, closing courts and attempting to seize the federal arsenal at Springfield.

The Confederation government was effectively powerless to respond. Lacking both funds and military authority, Congress could offer no assistance. The rebellion was ultimately suppressed by a state militia supported by private funds, underscoring the inability of the national government to maintain order.

The implications were profound. For many leaders, including George Washington and Alexander Hamilton, Shays’ Rebellion demonstrated that the existing system was untenable. A government that could not enforce laws or ensure domestic tranquility was doomed to collapse.

Toward a New Constitution

Efforts to address these problems began modestly. The Annapolis Convention of 1786, initially convened to discuss trade issues, concluded that broader reforms were necessary and called for a general convention in Philadelphia. In February 1787, Congress endorsed this proposal, though officially only to revise the Articles.

The Philadelphia Convention, however, quickly moved beyond revision. Delegates recognized that the Articles’ fundamental structure, particularly the reliance on voluntary state compliance, could not support an effective national government. The solution was to become an entirely new framework: the United States Constitution.

Ratified in 1788 and implemented the following year, the Constitution addressed the central weaknesses of the Articles by establishing a stronger federal government with the power to tax, regulate commerce, enforce laws, and operate through separate executive, legislative, and judicial branches.

Legacy and Historical Significance

It is tempting to view the Articles of Confederation solely as a failure, a flawed experiment quickly discarded in favor of a superior system. Such a perspective, however, overlooks their broader significance. The Articles represented a necessary first step in the creation of the American republic. They reflected the political realities and ideological commitments of their time, particularly the pervasive fear of centralized authority.

Their shortcomings provided invaluable lessons. The Constitution did not emerge in a vacuum; it was shaped directly by the experience of governing under the Articles. The framers understood, from hard experience, the dangers of both excessive centralization and excessive decentralization. The resulting system sought to balance these concerns, creating a government strong enough to function yet constrained enough to preserve liberty.

The Articles also demonstrated that political systems can evolve. They were not the final word on American governance, but an early chapter in an ongoing process of constitutional development. Their legacy lies not only in what they achieved, but in what they revealed about the challenges of building a nation.

In this sense, the Articles of Confederation were not a failure so much as an experiment, one conducted under extraordinary pressure, with limited precedent, and with stakes that could scarcely have been higher. They held the union together long enough for a more durable system to emerge. That alone secures their place in the story of American constitutional history.

Image generated by author using ChatGPT.

Sources

National Archives: Articles of Confederation (1777) — Primary Document

Library of Congress: Articles of Confederation — John Dickinson (1778)

HISTORY.com: Articles of Confederation — Weaknesses, Definition, Date

George Washington’s Mount Vernon: The Articles of Confederation

U.S. Department of State, Office of the Historian: Articles of Confederation, 1777–1781

Encyclopedia of Greater Philadelphia: Articles of Confederation

Encyclopaedia Britannica: John Dickinson

Wikipedia: John Dickinson

Historical Society of Pennsylvania (via Panorama/SHEAR): The John Dickinson Draft of the Articles of Confederation

National Archives: John Dickinson Writings

University of Delaware Library: John Dickinson — Penman of the Revolution

EBSCO Research Starters: Analysis — Articles of Confederation

Wikipedia: Articles of Confederation

Wikipedia: Shays’s Rebellion

National Constitution Center: Summary of Shays’ Rebellion

American History Central: Articles of Confederation

SLCC Press / Attenuated Democracy: Chapter 12 — Articles of Confederation, Shays’ Rebellion and the Road to the Constitution

GovFacts.org: Why the Articles of Confederation Failed

Benjamin Franklin and Slavery: A Complicated Legacy

By John Turley

On May 7, 2026

In History, Politics

Few figures in American history are as celebrated — or as contradictory — as Benjamin Franklin. Founding Father, inventor, diplomat, and philosopher. Franklin is remembered for just about everything except the uncomfortable truth that he was also, for much of his life, a slave owner. His relationship with slavery is a study in the slow, painful moral evolution of a brilliant but flawed man — one who spent decades benefiting from the institution he would spend his final years fighting to abolish.
The Slaveowner
Franklin was a slave owner beginning around 1735, and he owned enslaved people until at least 1785 when he freed two slaves after his return from France. Over the course of his life, there were up to seven named slaves in the Franklin household, including Peter, his wife Jemima, their son Othello, and George, John, and King.
Franklin’s complicity in slavery extended beyond personal ownership. As editor of the Pennsylvania Gazette, Franklin benefited financially from advertisements for runaway slaves and slave auctions that were paid for by slave owners and traders. He also used his printing press to publish content that supported the slave trade and, as a British colonial agent, sought to have the British government accept Georgia’s slave code. In short, slavery wasn’t just a private matter for Franklin — it was woven into his professional and financial life. At the same time, he printed Quaker antislavery tracts, a sign that his professional role placed him at the intersection of both pro‑slavery commerce and early antislavery movements.
What little we know about how Franklin treated his enslaved people comes mostly from letters and financial records. In part this is because northern slaveholders kept fewer detailed records of slave families, births, and deaths than large southern planters. His enslaved servants lived within his household and were integrated into domestic routines, a common arrangement in urban slavery that still left them legally and socially unfree.
When Franklin traveled to London in 1757, he brought two enslaved men, Peter and King, who lived and worked at 36 Craven Street. Peter remained with Franklin until their departure in 1762, but King ran away sometime in 1758 and was later found living in Suffolk, having been taken in by a Christian woman who taught him to read and write. The fact that King fled at the first opportunity tells its own story about the nature of slavery, whatever Franklin’s personal demeanor may have been.
His Evolving Written Views
Franklin’s early writings on slavery were at best ambivalent and at worst openly racist. In his 1751 essay “Observations Concerning the Increase of Mankind,” Franklin argued that slave labor wasn’t economically efficient in part because enslaved people pilfered from their owners, writing that “almost every Slave [being] by Nature a Thief.” His concern about slavery in this period was largely economic rather than moral — he worried that it would hurt poor white laborers and enriched a wealthy elite, not that it was a profound violation of human dignity.
By the 1760s, something began to shift. His perspective began to change following a 1759 visit arranged by his friend Samuel Johnson to one of Dr. Bray’s schools for Black children. He also met Anthony Benezet, who had started a school in Philadelphia and would later co-found the Abolition Society. By 1763, Franklin wrote that African “shortcomings” were not inherent but came from lack of education, slavery, and negative environments — and that he saw no difference in learning ability between African and white children.
While in London in the 1760s, he supported black education projects and in 1770 anonymously published “Conversations between an Englishman, a Scotchman, and an American,” a piece that criticized both the slave trade and the broader institution. In 1782 he circulated “A Thought Concerning the Sugar Islands,” condemning the African wars that fed the trade, the horrors of the Middle Passage, and the “numbers that die under the severities of slavery,” arguing that even sugar was morally tainted by blood.
By the late 1780s, Franklin’s language had become openly abolitionist. In 1787 he signed a public antislavery appeal declaring that the Creator had made “of one flesh, all the children of men,” and in 1789–1790 he wrote essays insisting that slavery was an “atrocious debasement of human nature.” He also argued that formerly enslaved people needed education, moral instruction, and employment to make the transition from bondage to full participation in civil society.
This was a meaningful intellectual leap for the era. Franklin was moving from a view of enslaved people as economic units toward recognizing their common humanity and the role that oppression itself played in creating the inequalities he had previously attributed to nature.
Franklin the Constitutional Convention and the Three-Fifths Compromise
By the time of the 1787 Constitutional Convention in Philadelphia, Franklin. then 81 years old, was a delegate from Pennsylvania. The Three-Fifths Compromise — which counted enslaved people as three-fifths of a person for purposes of congressional representation and taxation — was one of the most contentious issues at the Convention. The compromise was formally proposed by delegate James Wilson and seconded by Charles Pinckney.
Franklin’s specific role in the Three-Fifths Compromise itself is limited. His more direct contribution to the Convention’s structural debates was to the Great Compromise about proportional representation and spending rather than the slavery count.
Notably, just weeks before the Convention began, Franklin signed a public antislavery appeal stating that “the Creator of the world” had made “of one flesh, all the children of men.” Yet he ultimately signed a Constitution that embedded protections for slavery, including the Three-Fifths Compromise and a provision preventing Congress from banning the slave trade until 1808. Franklin’s acquiescence reflected his broader pragmatic calculation, shared by many Northern founders, that preserving the Union required compromise with the slaveholding South, even at a terrible moral cost. This is partly speculative — Franklin left few direct written statements about his reasoning on this specific tradeoff at the Convention.
The Abolitionist
Whatever compromises Franklin made at Philadelphia, the years that followed saw him embrace abolitionism with increasing conviction and urgency. In 1787, he began serving as President of the Pennsylvania Society for Promoting the Abolition of Slavery — the oldest abolitionist organization in the country — which had originally formed in 1775 and was reorganized and incorporated by Pennsylvania in 1789.
In 1789, Franklin wrote and published several essays supporting abolition, including a public address dated November 9th of that year in which he called slavery an “atrocious debasement of human nature.” He called for practical support for emancipated people, including education and employment — ideas that were radical for the time and would remain largely unaddressed for generations.
His final public act was perhaps his most consequential. On February 3, 1790, Franklin signed a petition to the first Congress on behalf of the Abolition Society, asking lawmakers to “devise means for removing the Inconsistency from the Character of the American People” and to “promote mercy and justice toward this distressed Race.” The petition was immediately denounced by pro-slavery congressmen and referred to a committee, which ultimately concluded that the Constitution prevented Congress from acting on the matter until 1808.
Franklin died in April 1790, just weeks after these debates, leaving a legacy that combined early complicity in slavery with later, forceful advocacy for abolition and Black education. As part of his will, he directed all remaining enslaved people in his household be freed upon his death, although it is unclear if he still owned slaves at the time and this may have been a symbolic declaration that he hoped others would follow. His life illustrates both the pervasiveness of slavery in colonial America — even among its most famous reformers — and the possibility, however belated, of moral and political transformation on the issue.
What to Make of It All
Franklin’s association with slavery resists easy conclusions. He spent roughly four and a half decades owning enslaved people, profiting from the slave trade through his newspaper, and diplomatically defending slavery when it served colonial interests. His evolution toward abolitionism was real, but it was also late — and driven partly by visits to schools for Black children and Quaker friendships rather than a spontaneous moral awakening.
At the same time, his final years represent one of the most prominent Founding Fathers publicly and passionately challenging the institution while other contemporaries remained silent or actively defended it. As historian David Waldstreicher has cautioned, Franklin’s antislavery credentials have sometimes been “remembered backwards” and exaggerated — but that doesn’t mean the later evolution wasn’t genuine.
What Franklin’s story offers isn’t a story of redemption so much as a realistic portrait of moral growth under the weight of self-interest, social norms, and political pragmatism. He was, as one observer put it, a man who showed himself to be “thoughtful, open, teachable” — eventually. The tragedy is how long it took, how few followed his lead, and how much damage was done in the meantime.

Illustration generated by author using ChatGPT.

Sources:
                Benjamin Franklin House – Franklin and Slavery
https://benjaminfranklinhouse.org/education/benjamin-franklin-and-slavery/

                Benjamin Franklin House – The Philadelphia Household 1735–1790
https://benjaminfranklinhouse.org/franklin-and-slavery-the-philadelphia-household-1735-1790/

                Online Library of Liberty – Benjamin Franklin and Slavery, Part One
https://oll.libertyfund.org/publications/reading-room/2023-07-05-ealy-franklin-slavery-part-one

                Benjamin Franklin Historical Society – Slavery and the Abolition Society
http://www.benjamin-franklin-history.org/slavery-abolition-society/

                National Archives – Benjamin Franklin’s Anti-Slavery Petitions to Congress
https://www.archives.gov/legislative/features/franklin

                Penn & Slavery Project – Benjamin Franklin
https://pennandslaveryproject.archives.upenn.edu/2025/07/09/benjamin-franklin/

                Commonplace: The Journal of Early American Life – Benjamin Franklin, Slavery, and the Founders
https://commonplace.online/article/benjamin-franklin-slavery/

                U.S. History – Ben Franklin and the Vexing Question of Race in America
https://www.ushistory.org/franklin/essays/franklin_race.htm

                Wikipedia – Benjamin Franklin
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Benjamin_Franklin

                Wikipedia – Three-Fifths Compromise
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Three-fifths_Compromise

                Britannica – Three-Fifths Compromise
https://www.britannica.com/topic/three-fifths-compromise

                U.S. Senate – Equal State Representation and the Great Compromise
https://www.senate.gov/about/origins-foundations/senate-and-constitution/equal-state-representation.htm

                Wikipedia – Connecticut Compromise
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Connecticut_Compromise

                Teaching American History – The Constitutional Convention: The Three-Fifths Clause
https://teachingamericanhistory.org/document/the-constitutional-convention-the-three-fifths-clause/

The Electoral College: Should America Go Popular?

By John Turley

On September 1, 2025

In Commentary, History, Politics

Few topics in American politics generate as much perennial debate as the Electoral College. Every four years, calls to abolish it resurface—often with renewed vigor when the electoral vote winner loses the popular vote, as happened in 1824, 1876, 1888, 2000, and 2016. The proposal is to elect the president by a nationwide popular vote, just as we do governors and senators.

Why We Have an Electoral College

The Electoral College was a late-stage compromise at the Constitutional Convention of 1787. The framers were balancing multiple tensions:

Large vs. small states
Slave vs. free states
Congress choosing the president vs. direct election

Delegates feared that direct election by popular vote would favor populous states, allow urban centers to dominate rural areas, and encourage demagogues to campaign purely on popular passions. At the same time, they worried about giving Congress too much control over the executive branch.

The system for selecting the president—via the Electoral College—was partly designed to prevent direct popular influence. Its original intent, according to historians, was to empower electors (seen as more knowledgeable) and to ensure thoughtful deliberation in choosing the president, guarding against the masses being swayed by charm rather than substance.

Some delegates—like James Madison, James Wilson, and Gouverneur Morris—supported direct popular election of the president, while others, like Elbridge Gerry and Roger Sherman, explicitly voiced distrust in direct election of the president and believed ordinary voters lacked impartiality or sufficient knowledge.

Institutional and political bargaining ultimately shaped the final structure. Their solution: each state gets electors equal to its total number of representatives and senators. The addition of two electors for the senators ensures that the small states remain, on a population basis, overrepresented in the Electoral College.

State legislatures determine how electors are chosen (eventually, every state moved to popular election). Most states now award all their electoral votes to the statewide popular vote winner—“winner-take-all.”

The Electoral College thus emerged not as anyone’s ideal system, but as a possible, workable compromise that balanced competing regional interests, philosophical concerns about democracy, and the practical realities of governing a large, diverse republic in the 18th century.

Pros of Eliminating the Electoral College

Equal Weight for Every Vote

The most compelling argument for eliminating the Electoral College centers on democratic equality. Under the current electoral system, a vote in Wyoming carries roughly three times the weight of a vote in California when measured by electoral votes per capita. To put this in real numbers Wyoming has about 193,000 people per electoral vote while California has about 718,000. This mathematical reality means that some Americans’ voices count more than others in selecting their president, a principle that seems to contradict the foundational democratic ideal of “one person, one vote.”

A national popular vote would ensure that every American’s vote carries identical weight, regardless of geography. This approach would eliminate scenarios where candidates win the presidency while losing the popular vote. Such outcomes can undermine public confidence in democratic institutions and raise questions about the legitimacy of electoral results.

Reflects the Will of the Majority

In two of the last six elections (2000 and 2016), the candidate with fewer total popular votes became president. While the framers accepted the possibility of divergence between the popular and electoral results, many modern Americans view such outcomes as undermining democratic legitimacy.

Encourages Nationwide Campaigning

Because many states are firmly “red” or “blue,” campaigns focus their energy on a handful of battleground states that could go either way—like Pennsylvania, Wisconsin, and Arizona. Under a popular vote, candidates would have an incentive to compete everywhere, because every additional vote counts the same regardless of location.

Simplifies the Process

The Electoral College system confuses many Americans and can seem archaic in the 21st century. A direct popular vote is straightforward and immediately understandable: the candidate who receives the most votes wins. This simplicity could increase public trust and participation in the democratic process.

Eliminates “Faithless Electors”

Although rare, faithless electors—those who cast electoral votes against their state’s popular choice—are possible under the current system. A direct election would remove this constitutional quirk.

Cons of Eliminating the Electoral College

Federalism Concerns

The United States is a union of states as well as a single nation. The Electoral College reinforces the role of states in presidential elections, reflecting their status as sovereign entities in certain respects. Abolishing it could be seen as eroding federalism by further centralizing power.

Risk of Regional Dominance

Opponents argue that without the Electoral College, candidates could focus disproportionately on high-population regions—California, Texas, Florida, New York—while ignoring rural states and smaller communities. Whether this would happen in practice is debated, but the perception of neglect could deepen regional divides.

Potential for Narrow-Margin Crises

In a popular vote system, a razor-thin margin would require a nationwide recount. Under the Electoral College, disputes are typically contained within a state (e.g., Florida in 2000). A national recount would be a logistical and political nightmare.

Constitutional Hurdles

Abolishing the Electoral College requires a constitutional amendment—an extraordinarily high bar. That means approval by two-thirds of both houses of Congress and ratification by three-quarters of the states. Smaller states, which benefit from the Electoral College’s vote weighting, have little incentive to approve such a change.

Intermediate Options

Since abolishing the Electoral College outright is politically unlikely in the near term, reform advocates have proposed middle-ground solutions.

The National Popular Vote Interstate Compact (NPVIC)

The NPVIC is an agreement among states to award all their electoral votes to the national popular vote winner, but it only takes effect once states totaling at least 270 electoral votes join. As of 2025, 17 states plus D.C. (totaling 209 electoral votes) have joined. This approach sidesteps a constitutional amendment but relies on states’ willingness to cede control over their electoral votes. The compact could be implemented without amending the constitution and achieves the functional equivalent of a popular vote. However, it has not been legally tested and would likely face court challenges. To me, the greatest drawback is that states could withdraw at any time. I would envision that in a closely contested and contentious election states unhappy with the national outcome would likely withdraw from the compact.

Proportional Allocation of Electoral Votes

Instead of winner-take-all, states could allocate electoral votes proportionally to the share of the statewide vote. Maine and Nebraska already use a variation of this system, awarding some votes by congressional district. Theoretically, this would reduce the impact of battleground states and increase the representation for minority views within states. But it could also increase the likelihood of no candidate reaching 270 electoral votes thereby sending the election into the House of Representatives. It still preserves the over representation of smaller states because it retains the two electors for senators.

If electors are awarded proportionally based on statewide voting, the popular vote may not be distributed in a manner to allow awarding of whole delegates. There’s no constitutional provision for awarding partial electors. This would be especially significant in states with only one or two representatives in the house.

If electors were awarded to the winners of each Congressional District this would encourage even more gerrymandering than we are currently seeing. Extreme gerrymandering could undermine any progress towards reflecting the popular vote, simply continuing the current mismatch of popular and electoral votes.

Gerrymandering is a political practice that involves manipulating the boundaries of electoral districts to benefit a particular party or group. It is nothing new in American politics, originating in the early 19th century. The term “gerrymandering” was coined after an 1812 incident in Massachusetts, where Governor Elbridge Gerry signed a bill redrawing district lines to favor his party. One of the districts resembled a mythical salamander in shape, inspiring the portmanteau “Gerry-mander” in a satirical cartoon by Elkanah Tisdale that helped popularize the term. It’s interesting, that since gerrymandering favored the Democratic-Republican Party and the newspaper that published the cartoon supported the Federalist Party, it was made to look not like a cute salamander but more like an ominous dragon.

Bonus Electoral Votes for National Popular Vote Winner

A hybrid idea would keep the Electoral College but award a fixed number of bonus electors (say, 100) to the national popular vote winner. This would almost guarantee alignment between the popular and electoral results without abandoning the current structure. This option maintains a state-based system and reduces the chance of a split result. But it would also require a constitutional amendment and add complexity that many voters may find confusing.

Feasibility of Change

Reforming or abolishing the Electoral College faces three main obstacles:

Constitutional Entrenchment – Article II and the 12th Amendment are clear about elector allocation. Full abolition would require one of the most difficult political feats in American governance—a constitutional amendment.
State Incentives – Smaller states and swing states have outsized influence under the current system. They are unlikely to support reforms that dilute their power.
Partisan Dynamics – Since recent Electoral College/popular vote splits have benefited Republicans, Democrats tend to favor reform, while Republicans tend to defend the status quo. That dynamic could shift if the pattern changes.

Conclusion

The Electoral College is both a relic of 18th-century compromises and a living feature of America’s federal structure. Its defenders argue that it protects smaller states, contains electoral disputes, and reinforces the states’ role in national governance. Its critics counter that it violates the principle of “one person, one vote” and distorts campaign priorities.

Abolishing it in favor of a direct popular vote would likely make presidential elections more democratic in the literal sense, but it would also raise questions about federalism, campaign strategy, and the handling of close results. The Electoral College preserves federalism and geographic balance but can produce outcomes that seem to contradict majority will.

Intermediate options like the NPVIC or proportional allocation may offer ways to mitigate the College’s most controversial effects without uprooting the constitutional framework but also face significant hurdles for implementation.

Whether reform happens will depend not just on the merits of the arguments, but on the political incentives of the states and the parties. Until those incentives shift, the Electoral College is likely to remain—imperfect, contentious, and uniquely American.

The Constitutional Foundations

By John Turley

On August 27, 2025

In Commentary, History, Politics

Who Controls Elections?

Donald Trump has repeatedly claimed that the president should have broad authority to change how elections are conducted—particularly when it comes to abolishing mail-in voting and voting machines. As recently as August 2025, Trump pledged to issue an executive order banning mail-in ballots and voting machines ahead of the 2026 midterm elections, insisting that states must comply with his directive because, in his words, “States act merely as ‘agents’ for the Federal Government when it comes to counting and tabulating votes.… They are required to follow what the Federal Government, represented by the President of the United States, instructs them to do, FOR THE GOOD OF OUR COUNTRY”.

But this isn’t the first time he has suggested that he could control the election process. In March 2025, Trump issued a major executive order titled “Preserving and Protecting the Integrity of American Elections” that aims to expand presidential control over the election process. The order attempts to direct the Election Assistance Commission (EAC) — an independent, bipartisan agency — to mandate that voters show a passport or other similar document proving citizenship when registering to vote using the federal voter registration form. The executive order has been the subject of extensive litigation, and several federal judges have issued injunctions against various portions of it.

Amid the COVID-19 pandemic during his first term, President Trump publicly suggested delaying the election. Constitutional scholars and members of Congress quickly pointed out he lacked such authority—the date of federal elections is set by statute, and only Congress could change it.

The U.S. Constitution provides a clear framework for who holds the authority to control elections, and it is not the president.

Article I, Section 4: Congressional and State Authority

The main constitutional authority over U.S. elections is found in Article I, Section 4, commonly called the “Elections Clause.” It states:

“The Times, Places and Manner of holding Elections for Senators and Representatives, shall be prescribed in each State by the Legislature thereof; but the Congress may at any time by Law make or alter such Regulations…”

This language charges state legislatures with defining the details of congressional elections, including logistics and procedures. Importantly, Congress retains the power to override state laws and impose federal rules—such as standardized Election Days or regulations for voter registration and districting.

What does this mean for the president? The Constitution is clear: the president has no direct authority to determine the conduct of congressional elections or to unilaterally change the way federal elections are held. Presidential influence over elections is limited to signing or vetoing congressional legislation, not acting alone.

Article II and the 12th Amendment: Presidential Elections

Presidential elections are regulated by Article II, which created the Electoral College, and by the 12th Amendment .

Article II, Section 1 provides:

“Each State shall appoint, in such Manner as the Legislature thereof may direct, a Number of Electors…”

States arrange how their presidential electors are selected, subject to changes imposed by congressional law. The federal government, through Congress (not the president!), determines the timing of choosing electors and casting electoral votes. The 12th Amendment sets procedures for how electors meet and vote for both president and vice president.

Again, neither Article II nor the 12th Amendment gives the president authority to independently set election rules. At most, the president can recommend reforms, sign laws crafted by Congress, and advocate for certain policies.

Historical Examples of Limits on Presidential Power Over Elections

Even during national crises, presidents have not been able to unilaterally change election rules:

1864 Election (Lincoln): Despite the Civil War, Abraham Lincoln did not postpone or suspend the presidential election. Elections were carried out in the states, including special arrangements for soldiers to vote.
1944 Election (Roosevelt): In the midst of World War II, Franklin Roosevelt stood for re-election. Again, no effort was made by the president to change election laws.

Presidential Powers: What Can the Executive Branch Do?

The president’s responsibilities in elections are more limited than you might expect and are essentially ministerial and ceremonial, not regulatory.

The executive power in Article II invests the president with broad national leadership, command of the military, and responsibility to “take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed”. This can include enforcing voting rights laws and overseeing federal agencies that support election integrity. However, the Constitution and decades of legal precedent restrict the president from directly controlling election rules.

The president cannot by executive order change state rules for voting methods (e.g., mail-in voting, voting machines).
The president cannot unilaterally suspend or postpone federal elections.
The president cannot direct states to alter their voter registration, polling locations, or other administrative details.
The president has no role in certifying state results. That function belongs to state officials, with Congress responsible for counting electoral votes.
The president can direct federal agencies like the Department of Justice to enforce federal election laws, protect voting rights, and intervene in cases of fraud or intimidation. The president does not have the authority to direct federal agencies to act in a manner contrary to the law.

When presidents have sought to influence election administration more directly, courts and Congress have reaffirmed the constitutional boundaries. For example, efforts to change the date of an election or prohibit certain voting methods without congressional action have consistently failed in the courts.

Congressional Power: The Real Check on Election Rules

While state legislatures remain the primary manager of elections, Congress retains the final word. The Supreme Court has confirmed that congressional law “preempts” conflicting state rules in matters of federal elections. When Congress acts—through laws like the Voting Rights Act, Help America Vote Act, and the National Voter Registration Act—states must comply, and the president’s role is simply to sign or veto those laws.

Congress has used its power over the years to:

Set a uniform national Election Day.
Establish protections for disabled voters and overseas citizens.
Mandate requirements around voter registration and accessibility.
Regulate campaign finance and transparency.

Checks, Balances, and Modern Tensions

Recent political debates have seen calls for presidents to take stronger action on election oversight, especially regarding the use of mail-in ballots or voting machines. However, these calls run up against clear constitutional limits: the president cannot rewrite the rules of elections without Congress or state legislatures.

Any presidential attempt to do so by executive order would face swift legal challenges and almost certainly be invalidated. The intent of the Framers was to divide election power between the states and Congress, with the president largely excluded from direct rule-making authority. This balance—central to federalism—protects elections from potential abuses of executive power and ensures that reforms require broad democratic consensus. While presidents can champion reforms and enforce federal laws supporting fair elections, they are constitutionally forbidden from unilaterally changing election rules.

Conclusion

The framework isn’t perfect—it can create confusion when state and federal authorities clash. But the basic principle remains: states run elections. Congress can regulate them within constitutional bounds, and presidents enforce the resulting laws.

For citizens, lawmakers, and presidents alike, respect for these boundaries secures the foundation of American democracy. The right to vote—and the integrity of how that vote is counted—is protected not by any single leader, but by enduring constitutional principles and the shared power of states and Congress.

Robert C. Byrd and Donald Trump

By John Turley

On April 29, 2025

In Commentary, Politics

A Clash of Constitutional Visions

Senator Robert C. Byrd was a West Virginia icon and it’s always risky to speculate on what a historic figure may have thought. However, many of Senator Byrd’s beliefs are well documented and I believe I can make reasonable assumptions about what he may have thought about our current political situation. Having served in the U.S. Senate over 51 years, from 1959 until his death in 2010— he would likely have viewed Donald Trump with deep concern, particularly in light of Byrd’s reverence for constitutional process, institutional norms, and congressional authority. He was known for his deep knowledge of Senate rules, fierce defense of the institution, and commitment to constitutional processes.

Here is my reasoned assessment of what Robert Byrd might have thought of Donald Trump, based on his record, writings, and public statements.

Byrd was a passionate constitutionalist and institutionalist. He always carried a pocket Constitution, lectured on its principles, and wrote extensively about the importance of maintaining the Senate’s independence as a check on executive power. He frequently warned against presidential overreach, even when it came from presidents in his own party.

I believe Byrd would probably have seen Trump’s frequent challenges to the separation of powers—such as ignoring congressional subpoenas, attempting to overturn the 2020 election, and asserting sweeping executive privilege—as a threat to the constitutional order.

Byrd idealized Senate decorum and was known for his formal oratory. He disliked crassness, impulsiveness, and public vulgarity. He once rebuked his colleagues for casual dress on the Senate floor.

Trump’s coarse rhetoric, personal insults, and use of Twitter to attack opponents would likely have appalled Byrd. He believed public office carried with it a solemn responsibility to elevate public discourse. In 1999, Byrd criticized President Clinton not just for the Monica Lewinsky scandal, but for diminishing the dignity of the office.

Though Byrd was a master of local politics and brought billions in federal dollars to West Virginia, he also warned against demagoguery. He valued political rhetoric grounded in principle, not spectacle. While Byrd might have appreciated Trump’s appeal to working-class Americans, he would likely have distrusted his populism as it comes at the expense of facts, reason, or institutional integrity.

Byrd’s own history on race is complicated. A former member of the KKK in the 1940s, he spent the latter decades of his career renouncing that association and supporting civil rights legislation. He called his early beliefs a great shame. Byrd’s political journey included dramatic personal change: from early segregationist and KKK member to a vocal supporter of civil rights and of the first Black presidential nominee, Barack Obama. Byrd likely would have been disturbed by Trump’s equivocations after Charlottesville and by rhetoric seen as racially divisive. Byrd worked hard to overcome his past and likely would have seen such behavior as regression rather than progress.

Byrd was one of the Senate’s strongest voices against the Iraq War, citing constitutional concerns over unchecked executive power in foreign affairs. He believed Congress must assert itself in matters of war and peace. Trump’s erratic foreign policy decisions—such as wavering defense commitments, transactional diplomacy, and overtures to authoritarian leaders—would likely have seemed reckless and unilateral to Byrd.

Senator Robert Byrd, though an institutional conservative in many ways, would likely have seen Donald Trump as a figure undermining the very traditions, checks, and civic virtues Byrd spent his career defending. His critique wouldn’t have been partisan—it would have been constitutional.

“The Constitution is not a pliable instrument to be molded and twisted at the whim of the President. It is our compass. It is our anchor.” — Robert C. Byrd