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Tag: Constitutional Convention

America’s First Constitution

The Articles of Confederation: Birth, Failures, and Legacy

The United States Constitution, ratified in 1788 and implemented in 1789, is often treated as the nation’s true founding framework. Yet before it, there existed another governing document, one far less celebrated but no less essential to understanding the early republic. The Articles of Confederation and Perpetual Union served as America’s first constitution from their adoption by the Continental Congress in 1777 to their replacement just over a decade later. Imperfect, fragile, and ultimately unsustainable, the Articles nevertheless provided the institutional bridge between revolution and nationhood.

To understand why the Articles were structured as they were—and why they ultimately failed we need to step back into the mindset of the revolutionary generation. The men who drafted them were not political theorists operating in calm conditions; they were wartime leaders grappling with uncertainty, scarcity, and deep suspicion of centralized authority. They had just rebelled against British tyranny, and they were determined not to allow such power on American soil. The result was a system deliberately designed to restrain national authority, even at the cost of efficiency. The Articles represented both a solution to immediate wartime needs and a reflection of deeply held ideological fears. Their story is not merely one of failure, but of experimentation, adaptation, and political learning.

Revolutionary Context and the Need for Union

The intellectual origins of the Articles stretch back well before independence. Colonial leaders had long recognized the potential benefits of intercolonial cooperation. Benjamin Franklin’s Albany Plan of Union in 1754 proposed a centralized colonial government capable of coordinating defense and managing relations with Native nations. Though ultimately rejected by the colonies, the plan foreshadowed later efforts at union by raising the fundamental question of how semi-autonomous political entities might cooperate without surrendering their independence.

That question became urgent during the American Revolution. When the Second Continental Congress convened in 1775, it functioned as a provisional government, but its authority was ambiguous and largely dependent on voluntary compliance. As the war intensified, it became increasingly clear that thirteen separate colonies could not effectively wage a coordinated struggle against the British Empire without some formal political structure. Congress needed legitimacy—not merely as a gathering of delegates, but as a governing body with recognized authority over military, diplomatic, and financial matters.

On June 11, 1776, Congress appointed a committee to draft a plan of confederation, even as another committee worked on the Declaration of Independence. The parallel timing was no coincidence. Independence required not only separation from Britain but also the creation of a new political order. The Articles were intended to provide that order, a framework through which the states could act collectively while preserving their individual sovereignty.

Drafting Under Pressure

The drafting process unfolded under extraordinary circumstances. John Dickinson of Pennsylvania, a respected lawyer and political thinker, chaired the committee and produced the initial draft in July 1776. Debate over its provisions, however, proved slow and contentious. Congress was simultaneously managing a war, and immediate military concerns often took precedence over constitutional deliberation.

Disagreements over representation, taxation, and western land claims delayed progress for more than a year. It was not until November 15, 1777, while Congress was in exile in York, Pennsylvania, following the British capture of Philadelphia, that the Articles were finally approved. Even then, the document was widely understood as a compromise rather than an ideal solution.

Ratification presented an additional challenge. Because the Articles required unanimous consent, any single state could delay their implementation. The principal obstacle came from disputes over western lands. States with expansive territorial claims, such as Virginia, were reluctant to relinquish them, while smaller states like Maryland insisted that such lands should be held in common for the benefit of the union. Only after Virginia agreed to cede its claims did Maryland ratify the Articles on March 1, 1781, bringing them into full effect.

Structure and Principles

The Articles of Confederation established a national government that was intentionally limited in scope. At its core was a unicameral Congress in which each state, regardless of size or population, held a single vote. This arrangement reflected the primacy of state sovereignty: the union was conceived not as a single nation but as a “league of friendship” among independent states.

The national government possessed certain powers, including the authority to declare war, negotiate treaties, coin money, and manage relations with Native nations. However, these powers were constrained by critical limitations. Congress could not levy taxes directly, regulate interstate commerce, or enforce its decisions upon the states. Instead, it relied on requisitions, little more than requests for funds, which states frequently ignored or, at best, only partially fulfilled.

Equally significant was the absence of both an executive branch and a national judiciary. There was no president to enforce laws or coordinate policy, and no federal court system to interpret them. Administrative functions were handled by committees and departments accountable to Congress, resulting in a diffuse and often ineffective system of governance.

Amending the Articles required unanimous consent, a provision that made meaningful reform nearly impossible. While intended to protect state sovereignty, this requirement ensured that structural weaknesses could not be easily corrected.

Achievements Under the Articles

Despite their limitations, the Articles of Confederation were not without success. Most importantly, they provided a legal framework that enabled the colonies to prosecute and ultimately win the Revolutionary War. The Continental Congress, operating under the authority of the Articles, secured crucial alliances, most notably with France, and negotiated the Treaty of Paris in 1783, which formally ended the conflict and recognized American independence.

The Confederation government also achieved lasting success in western land policy. The Land Ordinances of 1784 and 1785, followed by the Northwest Ordinance of 1787, established a systematic process for surveying, selling, and governing western territories. These measures ensured that new states would enter the union on equal footing with the original thirteen and prohibited slavery in the Northwest Territory. This framework not only facilitated orderly expansion but also set important precedents for federal authority over territories.

The Articles also fostered a sense of national identity, however fragile. They affirmed the name “United States of America” and maintained a formal union during a period when regional differences might easily have led to fragmentation.

Structural Weaknesses and Growing Crisis

The weaknesses of the Articles, however, became increasingly apparent in the postwar period. Financial instability was among the most pressing issues. Without the power to tax, Congress struggled to pay war debts, fund the military, or support basic governmental functions. Inflation, currency devaluation, and economic dislocation further compounded these difficulties.

Interstate economic conflict added another layer of instability. In the absence of federal regulation, states imposed tariffs and trade barriers against one another, undermining economic cohesion. Competing currencies and inconsistent policies created an environment of uncertainty that hindered recovery and growth.

The lack of enforcement mechanisms proved equally problematic. Congress could pass laws and enter into treaties, but it had no means of compelling compliance. States frequently ignored national directives, and often violated provisions of the Treaty of Paris, particularly regarding the treatment of loyalists and British creditors. This inability to enforce national policy damaged American credibility abroad.

These structural deficiencies reflected the underlying philosophy of the Articles: a deep distrust of centralized power. By the mid-1780s, it was becoming clear that excessive decentralization carried its own dangers.

Shays’ Rebellion and the Turning Point

The crisis reached a breaking point with Shays’ Rebellion in 1786–1787. Economic hardship, particularly among farmers in western Massachusetts, led to widespread unrest. Burdened by debt and high taxes, many farmers faced foreclosure and imprisonment. When legal and political remedies failed, they turned to direct action, closing courts and attempting to seize the federal arsenal at Springfield.

The Confederation government was effectively powerless to respond. Lacking both funds and military authority, Congress could offer no assistance. The rebellion was ultimately suppressed by a state militia supported by private funds, underscoring the inability of the national government to maintain order.

The implications were profound. For many leaders, including George Washington and Alexander Hamilton, Shays’ Rebellion demonstrated that the existing system was untenable. A government that could not enforce laws or ensure domestic tranquility was doomed to collapse.

Toward a New Constitution

Efforts to address these problems began modestly. The Annapolis Convention of 1786, initially convened to discuss trade issues, concluded that broader reforms were necessary and called for a general convention in Philadelphia. In February 1787, Congress endorsed this proposal, though officially only to revise the Articles.

The Philadelphia Convention, however, quickly moved beyond revision. Delegates recognized that the Articles’ fundamental structure, particularly the reliance on voluntary state compliance, could not support an effective national government. The solution was to become an entirely new framework: the United States Constitution.

Ratified in 1788 and implemented the following year, the Constitution addressed the central weaknesses of the Articles by establishing a stronger federal government with the power to tax, regulate commerce, enforce laws, and operate through separate executive, legislative, and judicial branches.

Legacy and Historical Significance

It is tempting to view the Articles of Confederation solely as a failure, a flawed experiment quickly discarded in favor of a superior system. Such a perspective, however, overlooks their broader significance. The Articles represented a necessary first step in the creation of the American republic. They reflected the political realities and ideological commitments of their time, particularly the pervasive fear of centralized authority.

Their shortcomings provided invaluable lessons. The Constitution did not emerge in a vacuum; it was shaped directly by the experience of governing under the Articles. The framers understood, from hard experience, the dangers of both excessive centralization and excessive decentralization. The resulting system sought to balance these concerns, creating a government strong enough to function yet constrained enough to preserve liberty.

The Articles also demonstrated that political systems can evolve. They were not the final word on American governance, but an early chapter in an ongoing process of constitutional development. Their legacy lies not only in what they achieved, but in what they revealed about the challenges of building a nation.

In this sense, the Articles of Confederation were not a failure so much as an experiment, one conducted under extraordinary pressure, with limited precedent, and with stakes that could scarcely have been higher. They held the union together long enough for a more durable system to emerge. That alone secures their place in the story of American constitutional history.

Image generated by author using ChatGPT.

Sources

National Archives: Articles of Confederation (1777) — Primary Document

Library of Congress: Articles of Confederation — John Dickinson (1778)

HISTORY.com: Articles of Confederation — Weaknesses, Definition, Date

George Washington’s Mount Vernon: The Articles of Confederation

U.S. Department of State, Office of the Historian: Articles of Confederation, 1777–1781

Encyclopedia of Greater Philadelphia: Articles of Confederation

Encyclopaedia Britannica: John Dickinson

Wikipedia: John Dickinson

Historical Society of Pennsylvania (via Panorama/SHEAR): The John Dickinson Draft of the Articles of Confederation

National Archives: John Dickinson Writings

University of Delaware Library: John Dickinson — Penman of the Revolution

EBSCO Research Starters: Analysis — Articles of Confederation

Wikipedia: Articles of Confederation

Wikipedia: Shays’s Rebellion

National Constitution Center: Summary of Shays’ Rebellion

American History Central: Articles of Confederation

SLCC Press / Attenuated Democracy: Chapter 12 — Articles of Confederation, Shays’ Rebellion and the Road to the Constitution

GovFacts.org: Why the Articles of Confederation Failed

Benjamin Franklin and Slavery: A Complicated Legacy


 
Few figures in American history are as celebrated — or as contradictory — as Benjamin Franklin. Founding Father, inventor, diplomat, and philosopher. Franklin is remembered for just about everything except the uncomfortable truth that he was also, for much of his life, a slave owner. His relationship with slavery is a study in the slow, painful moral evolution of a brilliant but flawed man — one who spent decades benefiting from the institution he would spend his final years fighting to abolish.
The Slaveowner
Franklin was a slave owner beginning around 1735, and he owned enslaved people until at least 1785 when he freed two slaves after his return from France.  Over the course of his life, there were up to seven named slaves in the Franklin household, including Peter, his wife Jemima, their son Othello, and George, John, and King.
Franklin’s complicity in slavery extended beyond personal ownership. As editor of the Pennsylvania Gazette, Franklin benefited financially from advertisements for runaway slaves and slave auctions that were paid for by slave owners and traders.  He also used his printing press to publish content that supported the slave trade and, as a British colonial agent, sought to have the British government accept Georgia’s slave code.  In short, slavery wasn’t just a private matter for Franklin — it was woven into his professional and financial life.  At the same time, he printed Quaker antislavery tracts, a sign that his professional role placed him at the intersection of both pro‑slavery commerce and early antislavery movements.
What little we know about how Franklin treated his enslaved people comes mostly from letters and financial records.  In part this is because northern slaveholders kept fewer detailed records of slave families, births, and deaths than large southern planters. His enslaved servants lived within his household and were integrated into domestic routines, a common arrangement in urban slavery that still left them legally and socially unfree.
When Franklin traveled to London in 1757, he brought two enslaved men, Peter and King, who lived and worked at 36 Craven Street. Peter remained with Franklin until their departure in 1762, but King ran away sometime in 1758 and was later found living in Suffolk, having been taken in by a Christian woman who taught him to read and write.  The fact that King fled at the first opportunity tells its own story about the nature of slavery, whatever Franklin’s personal demeanor may have been.
His Evolving Written Views
Franklin’s early writings on slavery were at best ambivalent and at worst openly racist. In his 1751 essay “Observations Concerning the Increase of Mankind,” Franklin argued that slave labor wasn’t economically efficient in part because enslaved people pilfered from their owners, writing that “almost every Slave [being] by Nature a Thief.”  His concern about slavery in this period was largely economic rather than moral — he worried that it would hurt poor white laborers and enriched a wealthy elite, not that it was a profound violation of human dignity.
By the 1760s, something began to shift. His perspective began to change following a 1759 visit arranged by his friend Samuel Johnson to one of Dr. Bray’s schools for Black children. He also met Anthony Benezet, who had started a school in Philadelphia and would later co-found the Abolition Society. By 1763, Franklin wrote that African “shortcomings” were not inherent but came from lack of education, slavery, and negative environments — and that he saw no difference in learning ability between African and white children.   
While in London in the 1760s, he supported black education projects and in 1770 anonymously published “Conversations between an Englishman, a Scotchman, and an American,” a piece that criticized both the slave trade and the broader institution. In 1782 he circulated “A Thought Concerning the Sugar Islands,” condemning the African wars that fed the trade, the horrors of the Middle Passage, and the “numbers that die under the severities of slavery,” arguing that even sugar was morally tainted by blood.
By the late 1780s, Franklin’s language had become openly abolitionist. In 1787 he signed a public antislavery appeal declaring that the Creator had made “of one flesh, all the children of men,” and in 1789–1790 he wrote essays insisting that slavery was an “atrocious debasement of human nature.” He also argued that formerly enslaved people needed education, moral instruction, and employment to make the transition from bondage to full participation in civil society.
This was a meaningful intellectual leap for the era. Franklin was moving from a view of enslaved people as economic units toward recognizing their common humanity and the role that oppression itself played in creating the inequalities he had previously attributed to nature.
Franklin the Constitutional Convention and the Three-Fifths Compromise
By the time of the 1787 Constitutional Convention in Philadelphia, Franklin. then 81 years old, was a delegate from Pennsylvania. The Three-Fifths Compromise — which counted enslaved people as three-fifths of a person for purposes of congressional representation and taxation — was one of the most contentious issues at the Convention. The compromise was formally proposed by delegate James Wilson and seconded by Charles Pinckney.
Franklin’s specific role in the Three-Fifths Compromise itself is limited. His more direct contribution to the Convention’s structural debates was to the Great Compromise about proportional representation and spending rather than the slavery count.
Notably, just weeks before the Convention began, Franklin signed a public antislavery appeal stating that “the Creator of the world” had made “of one flesh, all the children of men.”  Yet he ultimately signed a Constitution that embedded protections for slavery, including the Three-Fifths Compromise and a provision preventing Congress from banning the slave trade until 1808. Franklin’s acquiescence reflected his broader pragmatic calculation, shared by many Northern founders, that preserving the Union required compromise with the slaveholding South, even at a terrible moral cost. This is partly speculative — Franklin left few direct written statements about his reasoning on this specific tradeoff at the Convention.  
The Abolitionist
Whatever compromises Franklin made at Philadelphia, the years that followed saw him embrace abolitionism with increasing conviction and urgency. In 1787, he began serving as President of the Pennsylvania Society for Promoting the Abolition of Slavery  — the oldest abolitionist organization in the country — which had originally formed in 1775 and was reorganized and incorporated by Pennsylvania in 1789.
In 1789, Franklin wrote and published several essays supporting abolition, including a public address dated November 9th of that year in which he called slavery an “atrocious debasement of human nature.”  He called for practical support for emancipated people, including education and employment — ideas that were radical for the time and would remain largely unaddressed for generations.
His final public act was perhaps his most consequential. On February 3, 1790, Franklin signed a petition to the first Congress on behalf of the Abolition Society, asking lawmakers to “devise means for removing the Inconsistency from the Character of the American People” and to “promote mercy and justice toward this distressed Race.”  The petition was immediately denounced by pro-slavery congressmen and referred to a committee, which ultimately concluded that the Constitution prevented Congress from acting on the matter until 1808.
Franklin died in April 1790, just weeks after these debates, leaving a legacy that combined early complicity in slavery with later, forceful advocacy for abolition and Black education. As part of his will, he directed all remaining enslaved people in his household be freed upon his death, although it is unclear if he still owned slaves at the time and this may have been a symbolic declaration that he hoped others would follow.  His life illustrates both the pervasiveness of slavery in colonial America — even among its most famous reformers — and the possibility, however belated, of moral and political transformation on the issue.
 What to Make of It All
Franklin’s association with slavery resists easy conclusions. He spent roughly four and a half decades owning enslaved people, profiting from the slave trade through his newspaper, and diplomatically defending slavery when it served colonial interests. His evolution toward abolitionism was real, but it was also late — and driven partly by visits to schools for Black children and Quaker friendships rather than a spontaneous moral awakening.
At the same time, his final years represent one of the most prominent Founding Fathers publicly and passionately challenging the institution while other contemporaries remained silent or actively defended it. As historian David Waldstreicher has cautioned, Franklin’s antislavery credentials have sometimes been “remembered backwards” and exaggerated  — but that doesn’t mean the later evolution wasn’t genuine.
What Franklin’s story offers isn’t a story of redemption so much as a realistic portrait of moral growth under the weight of self-interest, social norms, and political pragmatism. He was, as one observer put it, a man who showed himself to be “thoughtful, open, teachable” — eventually. The tragedy is how long it took, how few followed his lead, and how much damage was done in the meantime.
 
Illustration generated by author using ChatGPT.

Sources:
                Benjamin Franklin House – Franklin and Slavery
https://benjaminfranklinhouse.org/education/benjamin-franklin-and-slavery/
 
                Benjamin Franklin House – The Philadelphia Household 1735–1790
https://benjaminfranklinhouse.org/franklin-and-slavery-the-philadelphia-household-1735-1790/
 
                Online Library of Liberty – Benjamin Franklin and Slavery, Part One
https://oll.libertyfund.org/publications/reading-room/2023-07-05-ealy-franklin-slavery-part-one
 
                Benjamin Franklin Historical Society – Slavery and the Abolition Society
http://www.benjamin-franklin-history.org/slavery-abolition-society/
 
                National Archives – Benjamin Franklin’s Anti-Slavery Petitions to Congress
https://www.archives.gov/legislative/features/franklin
 
                Penn & Slavery Project – Benjamin Franklin
https://pennandslaveryproject.archives.upenn.edu/2025/07/09/benjamin-franklin/
 
                Commonplace: The Journal of Early American Life – Benjamin Franklin, Slavery, and the Founders
https://commonplace.online/article/benjamin-franklin-slavery/
 
                U.S. History – Ben Franklin and the Vexing Question of Race in America
https://www.ushistory.org/franklin/essays/franklin_race.htm
 
                Wikipedia – Benjamin Franklin
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Benjamin_Franklin
 
                Wikipedia – Three-Fifths Compromise
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Three-fifths_Compromise
 
                Britannica – Three-Fifths Compromise
https://www.britannica.com/topic/three-fifths-compromise
 
                U.S. Senate – Equal State Representation and the Great Compromise
https://www.senate.gov/about/origins-foundations/senate-and-constitution/equal-state-representation.htm
 
                Wikipedia – Connecticut Compromise
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Connecticut_Compromise
 
                Teaching American History – The Constitutional Convention: The Three-Fifths Clause
https://teachingamericanhistory.org/document/the-constitutional-convention-the-three-fifths-clause/​​​​​​​​​​​​​​​​
 

Slavery and the Constitutional Convention: The Compromise That Shaped a Nation

When fifty-five delegates gathered in Philadelphia during the sweltering summer of 1787, they faced a challenge that would haunt American politics for the next eight decades. The question wasn’t whether slavery was morally right—many delegates privately acknowledged its evil—but whether a unified nation could exist with slavery as a part of it. That summer, the institution of slavery nearly killed the Constitution before it was born.

The Battle Lines

The convention revealed a stark divide. On one side stood delegates who spoke forcefully against slavery, though they represented a minority voice. Gouverneur Morris of Pennsylvania delivered some of the most scathing condemnations, calling slavery a “nefarious institution” and “the curse of heaven on the states where it prevailed.” According to James Madison’s notes, Morris argued passionately that counting enslaved people for representation would mean that someone “who goes to the Coast of Africa, and in defiance of the most sacred laws of humanity tears away his fellow creatures from their dearest connections & damns them to the most cruel bondages, shall have more votes in a Government instituted for protection of the rights of mankind.”

Luther Martin of Maryland, himself a slaveholder, joined Morris in opposition. He declared the slave trade “inconsistent with the principles of the revolution and dishonorable to the American character.”.  Even George Mason of Virginia, who owned over 200 enslaved people, denounced slavery at the convention, warning that “every master of slaves is born a petty tyrant” and that it would bring “the judgment of heaven on a country.”

The Southern Coalition

Facing these critics stood delegates from the Deep South—primarily South Carolina and Georgia—who made it abundantly clear that protecting slavery was non-negotiable. The South Carolina delegation was particularly unified and aggressive in defending the institution. All four of their delegates—John Rutledge, Charles Pinckney, Charles Cotesworth Pinckney, and Pierce Butler—owned slaves, and they spoke with one voice.

Charles Cotesworth Pinckney stated bluntly: “South Carolina and Georgia cannot do without slaves.” John Rutledge framed it even more starkly: “The true question at present is, whether the Southern States shall or shall not be parties to the Union.” The message was unmistakable—attempt to restrict slavery, and there would be no Constitution and perhaps no United States.

The Southern states didn’t just defend slavery; they threatened to walk out repeatedly. When debates over the slave trade heated up on August 22, delegates from North Carolina, South Carolina, and Georgia stated they would “never be such fools as to give up” their right to import enslaved Africans.  These weren’t idle threats—they were credible enough to force compromise.

The Three-Fifths Compromise

The central flashpoint came over representation in Congress. The new Constitution would base representation on population, but should enslaved people count? Southern states wanted every enslaved person counted fully, which would dramatically increase their congressional power. Northern states argued that enslaved people—who had no rights and couldn’t vote—shouldn’t count at all.

The three-fifths ratio had actually been debated before. Back in 1783, Congress had considered using it to calculate state tax obligations under the Articles of Confederation, though that proposal failed. James Wilson of Pennsylvania resurrected the idea at the Constitutional Convention, suggesting that representation be based on the free population plus three-fifths of “all other persons”—the euphemism they used to avoid writing the word “slave” in the Constitution.

The compromise passed eight states to two. New Jersey and Delaware are generally identified as the states voting against the compromise, New Hampshire is not listed as taking part in the vote. Rhode Island did not send a delegation to the convention and by the time of the vote New York no longer had a functioning delegation.

Though the South ultimately accepted the compromise, it wasn’t what they wanted. Southern delegates had pushed to count enslaved people equally with free persons—but otherwise ignored on all issues of human rights. The three-fifths ratio was a reduction from their demands—a limitation on slave state power, though it still gave them substantial advantage. With about 93% of the nation’s enslaved population concentrated in just five southern states, this compromise increased the South’s congressional delegation by 42%.

James Madison later recognized the compromise’s significance. He wrote after the convention: “It seems now to be pretty well understood that the real difference of interests lies not between the large and small but between the northern and southern states. The institution of slavery and its consequences form the line of discrimination.”

Could the Constitution Have Happened Without It?

Here’s where I need to speculate, but I’m fairly confident in this assessment: no, the Constitution would not have been ratified without the three-fifths compromise and related concessions on slavery.

The evidence is overwhelming. South Carolina and Georgia delegates stated explicitly and repeatedly that they would not join any union that restricted slavery. Alexander Hamilton himself later acknowledged that “no union could possibly have been formed” without the three-fifths compromise. Even delegates who despised slavery, like Roger Sherman of Connecticut, argued it was “better to let the Southern States import slaves than to part with them.”

The convention negotiated three major slavery compromises, all linked. Beyond the three-fifths clause, they agreed Congress couldn’t ban the international slave trade until 1808, and they included the Fugitive Slave Clause requiring the return of escaped enslaved people even from free states. These deals were struck together on August 29, 1787, in what Madison’s notes reveal was a package negotiation between northern and southern delegates.

Without these compromises, the convention would likely have collapsed. The alternative wouldn’t have been a better Constitution—it would have been no Constitution at all, potentially leaving the thirteen states as separate nations or weak confederations. Whether that would have been preferable is a profound counterfactual question that historians still debate.

The Impact on Early American Politics

The three-fifths compromise didn’t just affect one document—it shaped American politics for decades. Its effects were immediate and substantial.

The most famous early example came in the presidential election of 1800. Thomas Jefferson defeated John Adams in what’s often called the “Revolution of 1800″—the first peaceful transfer of power between opposing political parties. But Jefferson’s victory owed directly to the three-fifths compromise. Virginia’s enslaved population gave the state extra electoral votes that proved decisive. Historian Garry Wills has speculated that without these additional slave-state votes, Jefferson would have lost. Pennsylvania had a free population 10% larger than Virginia’s, yet received 20% fewer electoral votes because Virginia’s numbers were inflated by the compromise.

The impact extended far beyond that single election. Research shows the three-fifths clause changed the outcome of over 55% of legislative votes in the Sixth Congress (1799-1801). (The additional southern representatives—about 18 more than their free population warranted—gave the South what became known as the “Slave Power” in Congress.

This power influenced major legislation throughout the antebellum period. The Indian Removal Act of 1830, which forcibly relocated Native Americans to open land for plantation agriculture, passed because of margins provided by these extra southern representatives. The Missouri Compromise, the Kansas-Nebraska Act, and numerous other slavery-related measures bore the fingerprints of this constitutional imbalance.

The compromise also affected Supreme Court appointments and federal patronage. Southern-dominated Congresses ensured pro-slavery justices and policies that protected the institution. The sectional tensions it created led directly to later compromises—the Missouri Compromise of 1820, the Compromise of 1850—each one a temporary bandage on a wound that wouldn’t heal.

By the 1850s, the artificial political power granted to slave states had become intolerable to many northerners. When Abraham Lincoln won the presidency in 1860 without carrying a single southern state, southern political leaders recognized they had lost control of the federal government. Senator Louis Wigfall of Texas complained that non-slaveholding states now controlled Congress and the Electoral College. Ten southern states seceded in large part because they believed the three-fifths compromise no longer protected their interests.

The Bitter Legacy

The framers consciously avoided using the words “slave” or “slavery” in the Constitution, recognizing it would “sully the document.” But the euphemisms fooled no one. They had built slavery into the structure of American government, trading moral principles for political union.

The Civil War finally resolved what the Constitutional Convention had delayed. The Thirteenth Amendment abolished slavery in 1865, but not until 1868 did the Fourteenth Amendment finally strike the three-fifths clause from the Constitution, requiring that representation be based on counting the “whole number of persons” in each state.

Was it worth it? That’s ultimately a question of values. The Constitution created a stronger national government that eventually abolished slavery, but it took 78 years and a war that killed over 600,000 Americans. As Thurgood Marshall noted on the Constitution’s bicentennial, the framers “consented to a document which laid a foundation for the tragic events which were to follow.”

The convention delegates knew what they were doing. They chose union over justice, pragmatism over principle. Whether that choice was necessary, wise, or moral remains one of the most contested questions in American history.

____________________________________________________

Sources

  1. https://www.battlefields.org/learn/articles/slavery-and-constitution
  2. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Luther_Martin
  3. https://schistorynewsletter.substack.com/p/7-october-2024
  4. https://www.americanacorner.com/blog/constitutional-convention-slavery
  5. https://www.nps.gov/articles/000/constitutionalconvention-august22.htm
  6. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Three-fifths_Compromise
  7. https://www.brennancenter.org/our-work/analysis-opinion/electoral-colleges-racist-origins
  8. https://www.gilderlehrman.org/history-resources/teaching-resource/historical-context-constitution-and-slavery
  9. https://www.nps.gov/articles/000/constitutionalconvention-august29.htm
  10. https://www.lwv.org/blog/three-fifths-compromise-and-electoral-college
  11. https://www.aaihs.org/a-compact-for-the-good-of-america-slavery-and-the-three-fifths-compromise-part-ii/

The Best President Ever

As we get closer to the upcoming presidential election, I’m looking forward to the latest round of articles about “the best president ever”. These lists usually include Abraham Lincoln, FDR and Thomas Jefferson somewhere in the top three or four depending on where in the cycle of historic popularity their reputations happen to be. Other presidents such as Teddy Roosevelt, Wilson, Truman, Eisenhower and Reagan will go on and off the list depending on the whims and the political orientations of the list makers. JFK has occasionally been on the list of best presidents since shortly after his assassination. The more recent a president, the more likely he is to show up on these lists. This is due partly to the fact that we tend to give higher regard to those things about which we have firsthand knowledge. Any list done over the last 15 to 20 years may include Clinton or Obama or Trump, although, given the polarization of the political process today it’s unlikely that all three would be on the same list.

But what exactly does “best president” mean? How would you come up with quantitative measures that can be used to grade presidents and create a reproducible list? Of course, being “best “ largely depends on the severity of the problems faced by the president and the success of his solutions. It also seems to me that all such lists must be subjective and influenced by the political ideology, social position, financial status, education, and region of the country of the list maker. Personally, I don’t know how to even begin to rate a best president.

While I may not know who the best president was, I strongly believe I can tell you who the most important president was and always will be, that is George Washington. To borrow a phrase from historian James Flexner, Washington was the indispensable man. He had the combination of experience, strength and dignity that was necessary to guide this country through those first critical years. Without his initial leadership it’s possible that the country may have disintegrated it into several smaller bickering independent states that likely would have been annexed by the European powers. George Washington is the man who turned These United States with an emphasis on States into The United States with an emphasis on United.

George Washington’s importance began before there was a presidency or even a formal government. Without his leadership as the commanding general of the Continental Army there likely never would have been a United States at all.

Washington was never a great tactical general. He had very few battlefield victories, although his victories at Trenton and Princeton came at an important time for the fledgling revolution. They might even be considered strategic victories and it was his role as a strategic general that led to eventual victory.

Washington recognized that he did not have to win on the battlefield but only had to maintain the Continental Army as a field force and outlast the British will to conduct an overseas war. At a time when others were urging him to meet the British in a large European style battle, he recognized that losing decisively on a battlefield may have been enough to shatter the Continental Army and with it the entire Revolution. If you are not familiar with the many attempts early in the Revolutionary War to oust Washington from command, it will be well worth your time to read more about it.

At the end of the Revolution, Washington returned his Commission to the Continental Congress and retired to Mount Vernon. He expected to spend the rest of his days managing his estates. But his country was not yet done with him.

After the Revolution, the country was governed under the Articles of Confederation, a document that Washington called …” a rope of sand.” Multiple attempts were made to revise the articles, including a failed convention in Annapolis in 1786, to which only five states sent representatives.

When another convention was called in Philadelphia in 1787, Washington initially declined to participate, believing it would be no more successful than the Annapolis convention had been. Finally, James Madison and Henry Knox persuaded him to attend.

Washington arrived in Philadelphia and was promptly elected president of the convention. It was his presence that largely influenced every state except Rhode Island to send delegates. His presence also emboldened the delegates to embark on the creation of a new Constitution, rather than a simple revision of the articles as they had been tasked by their states.

As president of the convention, Washington maintained a non-partisan role. He seldom participated in debate and generally joined in the voting without comment. He felt it was his role to maintain the decorum of the convention, something he could do only by remaining above the fray.

Currently, there is much debate about the three-fifths clause and the role of slavery in the shaping of the Constitution. At the time, this was not the only contentious issue being debated. The role of a chief executive had the potential to be equally divisive.

Having just fought a revolution against a monarchy, many of the delegates had a strong distrust of centralized power. An initial proposal was to place executive power in a three man board. Prolonged discussion revolved around how to choose the board and how it would function. As it became clear that Washington could be the first president under a new constitution, support solidified behind the single chief executive. Without his presence, there may never have been a presidency at all.

Much has been made about the role of the Federalist Papers in the ratification of the Constitution. While they undoubtedly influenced the wealthy and the well-educated, the knowledge that Washington supported the Constitution and would be, without doubt, the first president was more important to the average citizen.

Washington was so popular at the time that some even suggested he be made “King of America”; an idea he would never even acknowledge.

In sum, even before he took the oath of office, George Washington was indeed our most important president.

Further reading:
Washington: A Life, Ron Chernow.

George Washington: The Political Rise of America’s Founding Father, David O. Stewart.

Washington: The Indispensable Man, James Thomas Flexnor.

George Washington’s Journey: The President Forges a New Nation, T. H. Breen.

The Summer of 1787: The Men Who Invented the Constitution, David O. Stewart.

George Washington: A Biography, Douglas Southall Freeman. This seven-volume set is the gold standard of Washington biographies.

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