
The Continental Marines at Nassau
When the Second Continental Congress authorized the creation of the Continental Marines on November 10, 1775, few could foresee their pivotal role in orchestrating North America’s first amphibious assault less than four months later. The operation against Nassau, on New Providence Island in the Bahamas, was born of necessity, marked by improvisation, and ultimately set the tone for Marine Corps operations—an audacious legacy that endures to this day.
Origins: Gunpowder Desperation and Strategic Vision
The American Revolution’s early years were marked by chronic shortages, especially of gunpowder. After the British seized stores destined for the Patriot cause, intelligence uncovered that significant quantities were stockpiled at Nassau. The Continental Congress approached this challenge with typical Revolutionary War creativity—they would use their brand-new Navy and even newer Marines to solve an Army problem. The Congress’ official instructions to Commodore Esek Hopkins focused on patrolling the Virginia and Carolina coasts, but “secret orders” directed attention to the Bahamas, setting in motion a bold plan to directly address the fledgling army’s supply crisis.
Organization: The Making of an Amphibious Battalion
With barely three months’ existence, the Continental Marines had hastily raised five companies of around 300 men. Captain Samuel Nicholas, tasked as the first Marine officer, oversaw their training and organization in Philadelphia. Their equipment was uneven—many wore civilian garb rather than uniforms and carried whatever muskets and bayonets were available. The uniform regulations specifying the now famous green coats with white facings were not promulgated until several months after the raid was over.
The Voyage South: Challenges and Preparation
Hopkins’ fleet consisted of the ships Alfred, Hornet, Wasp, Fly, Andrew Doria, Cabot, Providence, and Columbus. In addition to ships’ crews, the fleet carried more than 200 Continental Marines under the command of Captain Nicholas. The expedition began inauspiciously on January 4, 1776, when the fleet attempted to leave Philadelphia but became trapped by ice in the Delaware River for six weeks.
When they finally reached the Atlantic on February 17, 1776, the small fleet faced additional challenges. Disease found its way onboard most of the ships. Smallpox was a huge concern and was reported on at least four ships.
The fleet’s journey to the Caribbean took nearly two weeks of sailing through challenging winter conditions. Despite the hardships, Hopkins maintained the element of surprise—British intelligence had detected American naval preparations but assumed the fleet was bound for New York or Boston, not the distant Bahamas.
Implementation: Amphibious Innovation at Nassau
The element of surprise was initially lost when the fleet’s approach triggered alarm at Nassau. Plans to storm the stronger Fort Nassau dissolved, and Hopkins convened a council to identify a new landing point. A revised strategy saw about 230 Marines and 50 sailors, led by Captain Nicholas, land from longboats two miles east of the weaker Fort Montagu on March 3, 1776. They wore a patchwork of civilian clothes and white breeches—some men had managed to find green shirts as a form of identification. They set out marching toward the fort armed with muskets and bayonets, looking perhaps more like pirates than soldiers.
Their advance was met with only token resistance. Outnumbered and ill-prepared, local militia withdrew as Nicholas’s men captured Fort Montagu in what historian Edwin Simmons called a “battle as bemused as it was bloodless.”
Nicholas decided to wait until morning to advance on the town. His decision was tactically sound given the circumstances—he’d lost surprise, did not know the enemy’s strength, was operating in unknown terrain, night was falling, and he lacked naval support. However, this prudent military decision allowed Governor Browne to escape with over 80% of Nassau’s gunpowder stores, turning what could have been a complete strategic victory into a partial success. This incident highlights the tension between tactical prudence and strategic urgency that was destined to become a recurring theme in amphibious warfare.
The next day the Americans took Fort Nassau and arrested the Governor, Montfort Browne. Browne had already sent most of the coveted gunpowder on to St. Augustine, Florida, the night before. Despite this, American forces seized cannons, shells, and other military stores before occupying Nassau for nearly two weeks.
Marine discipline and flexibility were evident, as they pivoted from their surprise landing, conducted operations deep inland, and created their evolving amphibious reputation. The fleet departed on March 17, not before stripping Nassau and its forts of anything militarily useful.

Aftermath: Growing Pains and Enduring Lessons
Though the mission failed in its primary objective of securing a cache of gunpowder, its operational successes far outweighed the losses. The Marines returned with large quantities of artillery, munitions, and several recaptured vessels. On the return leg, they faced and fought (though did not defeat) HMS Glasgow; the squadron returned to New England by April 8, with several casualties including the first Marine officer killed in action, Lt. John Fitzpatrick.
Controversy followed—Hopkins was censured for failing to engage British forces as directed in his official orders. Nicholas was promoted to major and tasked with raising additional Marine companies for new frigates then under construction. These developments reflected both the lessons learned and the growing recognition of the value of the Marine force in expeditionary operations ashore.
A second raid on Nassau by Continental Marines occurred from January 27–30, 1778, under Captain John Peck Rathbun. Marines and seamen landed covertly at midnight, quickly seizing Fort Nassau and liberating American prisoners held by the British. The raiders proceeded to capture five anchored vessels, dismantled Fort Montagu, spiked the guns, and loaded 1,600 lbs of captured gunpowder before departing. This bold operation marked the first time the Stars and Stripes flew over a foreign fort and showcased the resourcefulness of American forces, who managed to strike a valuable blow against British power in the Caribbean without suffering casualties.
Long-Term Implications for the United States Marine Corps
The Nassau operation set powerful precedents:
- Amphibious Warfare Doctrine: This was the Marines’ first organized amphibious landing, shaping the Corps’ future focus on rapid deployment from sea to shore, a hallmark that continues in modern doctrine. This was likely referred to at the time as a Naval landing, as the word amphibious did not come into use in this context until the 1930s.
- Adaptability Under Fire: The improvisational tactics used at Nassau foreshadowed the Corps’ reputation for flexibility and mission focus.
- Naval Integration: Joint operations with the Navy not only succeeded tactically, but helped institutionalize the Marine-Navy partnership, with Marines serving as shipboard security, landing parties, and naval infantry.
- Legacy of Boldness: This first operation established a “first-in” ethos and a culture embracing challenge and audacity, foundational principles in Marine culture.
After the war, the Continental Marines disbanded, only to be re-established in 1798. Yet the legacy of Nassau endured. “Semper Fidelis”—always faithful—has its roots in that March 1776 assault, when the odds seemed long and the stakes critical.
Today’s United States Marine Corps draws a direct lineage from that small, ragtag battalion of Marines scrambling ashore at Nassau, forever entwining its identity with the promise, risk, and legacy of that first storied mission. Every modern Marine, stepping from ship to shore, walks in the footprints of Captain Samuel Nicholas and his men—soldiers of the sea whose boldness, improvisation, and teamwork have echoed across the centuries.









The Electoral College: Should America Go Popular?
By John Turley
On September 1, 2025
In Commentary, History, Politics
Few topics in American politics generate as much perennial debate as the Electoral College. Every four years, calls to abolish it resurface—often with renewed vigor when the electoral vote winner loses the popular vote, as happened in 1824, 1876, 1888, 2000, and 2016. The proposal is to elect the president by a nationwide popular vote, just as we do governors and senators.
Why We Have an Electoral College
The Electoral College was a late-stage compromise at the Constitutional Convention of 1787. The framers were balancing multiple tensions:
Delegates feared that direct election by popular vote would favor populous states, allow urban centers to dominate rural areas, and encourage demagogues to campaign purely on popular passions. At the same time, they worried about giving Congress too much control over the executive branch.
The system for selecting the president—via the Electoral College—was partly designed to prevent direct popular influence. Its original intent, according to historians, was to empower electors (seen as more knowledgeable) and to ensure thoughtful deliberation in choosing the president, guarding against the masses being swayed by charm rather than substance.
Some delegates—like James Madison, James Wilson, and Gouverneur Morris—supported direct popular election of the president, while others, like Elbridge Gerry and Roger Sherman, explicitly voiced distrust in direct election of the president and believed ordinary voters lacked impartiality or sufficient knowledge.
Institutional and political bargaining ultimately shaped the final structure. Their solution: each state gets electors equal to its total number of representatives and senators. The addition of two electors for the senators ensures that the small states remain, on a population basis, overrepresented in the Electoral College.
State legislatures determine how electors are chosen (eventually, every state moved to popular election). Most states now award all their electoral votes to the statewide popular vote winner—“winner-take-all.”
The Electoral College thus emerged not as anyone’s ideal system, but as a possible, workable compromise that balanced competing regional interests, philosophical concerns about democracy, and the practical realities of governing a large, diverse republic in the 18th century.
Pros of Eliminating the Electoral College
Equal Weight for Every Vote
The most compelling argument for eliminating the Electoral College centers on democratic equality. Under the current electoral system, a vote in Wyoming carries roughly three times the weight of a vote in California when measured by electoral votes per capita. To put this in real numbers Wyoming has about 193,000 people per electoral vote while California has about 718,000. This mathematical reality means that some Americans’ voices count more than others in selecting their president, a principle that seems to contradict the foundational democratic ideal of “one person, one vote.”
A national popular vote would ensure that every American’s vote carries identical weight, regardless of geography. This approach would eliminate scenarios where candidates win the presidency while losing the popular vote. Such outcomes can undermine public confidence in democratic institutions and raise questions about the legitimacy of electoral results.
Reflects the Will of the Majority
In two of the last six elections (2000 and 2016), the candidate with fewer total popular votes became president. While the framers accepted the possibility of divergence between the popular and electoral results, many modern Americans view such outcomes as undermining democratic legitimacy.
Encourages Nationwide Campaigning
Because many states are firmly “red” or “blue,” campaigns focus their energy on a handful of battleground states that could go either way—like Pennsylvania, Wisconsin, and Arizona. Under a popular vote, candidates would have an incentive to compete everywhere, because every additional vote counts the same regardless of location.
Simplifies the Process
The Electoral College system confuses many Americans and can seem archaic in the 21st century. A direct popular vote is straightforward and immediately understandable: the candidate who receives the most votes wins. This simplicity could increase public trust and participation in the democratic process.
Eliminates “Faithless Electors”
Although rare, faithless electors—those who cast electoral votes against their state’s popular choice—are possible under the current system. A direct election would remove this constitutional quirk.
Cons of Eliminating the Electoral College
Federalism Concerns
The United States is a union of states as well as a single nation. The Electoral College reinforces the role of states in presidential elections, reflecting their status as sovereign entities in certain respects. Abolishing it could be seen as eroding federalism by further centralizing power.
Risk of Regional Dominance
Opponents argue that without the Electoral College, candidates could focus disproportionately on high-population regions—California, Texas, Florida, New York—while ignoring rural states and smaller communities. Whether this would happen in practice is debated, but the perception of neglect could deepen regional divides.
Potential for Narrow-Margin Crises
In a popular vote system, a razor-thin margin would require a nationwide recount. Under the Electoral College, disputes are typically contained within a state (e.g., Florida in 2000). A national recount would be a logistical and political nightmare.
Constitutional Hurdles
Abolishing the Electoral College requires a constitutional amendment—an extraordinarily high bar. That means approval by two-thirds of both houses of Congress and ratification by three-quarters of the states. Smaller states, which benefit from the Electoral College’s vote weighting, have little incentive to approve such a change.
Intermediate Options
Since abolishing the Electoral College outright is politically unlikely in the near term, reform advocates have proposed middle-ground solutions.
The National Popular Vote Interstate Compact (NPVIC)
The NPVIC is an agreement among states to award all their electoral votes to the national popular vote winner, but it only takes effect once states totaling at least 270 electoral votes join. As of 2025, 17 states plus D.C. (totaling 209 electoral votes) have joined. This approach sidesteps a constitutional amendment but relies on states’ willingness to cede control over their electoral votes. The compact could be implemented without amending the constitution and achieves the functional equivalent of a popular vote. However, it has not been legally tested and would likely face court challenges. To me, the greatest drawback is that states could withdraw at any time. I would envision that in a closely contested and contentious election states unhappy with the national outcome would likely withdraw from the compact.
Proportional Allocation of Electoral Votes
Instead of winner-take-all, states could allocate electoral votes proportionally to the share of the statewide vote. Maine and Nebraska already use a variation of this system, awarding some votes by congressional district. Theoretically, this would reduce the impact of battleground states and increase the representation for minority views within states. But it could also increase the likelihood of no candidate reaching 270 electoral votes thereby sending the election into the House of Representatives. It still preserves the over representation of smaller states because it retains the two electors for senators.
If electors are awarded proportionally based on statewide voting, the popular vote may not be distributed in a manner to allow awarding of whole delegates. There’s no constitutional provision for awarding partial electors. This would be especially significant in states with only one or two representatives in the house.
If electors were awarded to the winners of each Congressional District this would encourage even more gerrymandering than we are currently seeing. Extreme gerrymandering could undermine any progress towards reflecting the popular vote, simply continuing the current mismatch of popular and electoral votes.
Gerrymandering is a political practice that involves manipulating the boundaries of electoral districts to benefit a particular party or group. It is nothing new in American politics, originating in the early 19th century. The term “gerrymandering” was coined after an 1812 incident in Massachusetts, where Governor Elbridge Gerry signed a bill redrawing district lines to favor his party. One of the districts resembled a mythical salamander in shape, inspiring the portmanteau “Gerry-mander” in a satirical cartoon by Elkanah Tisdale that helped popularize the term. It’s interesting, that since gerrymandering favored the Democratic-Republican Party and the newspaper that published the cartoon supported the Federalist Party, it was made to look not like a cute salamander but more like an ominous dragon.
Bonus Electoral Votes for National Popular Vote Winner
A hybrid idea would keep the Electoral College but award a fixed number of bonus electors (say, 100) to the national popular vote winner. This would almost guarantee alignment between the popular and electoral results without abandoning the current structure. This option maintains a state-based system and reduces the chance of a split result. But it would also require a constitutional amendment and add complexity that many voters may find confusing.
Feasibility of Change
Reforming or abolishing the Electoral College faces three main obstacles:
Conclusion
The Electoral College is both a relic of 18th-century compromises and a living feature of America’s federal structure. Its defenders argue that it protects smaller states, contains electoral disputes, and reinforces the states’ role in national governance. Its critics counter that it violates the principle of “one person, one vote” and distorts campaign priorities.
Abolishing it in favor of a direct popular vote would likely make presidential elections more democratic in the literal sense, but it would also raise questions about federalism, campaign strategy, and the handling of close results. The Electoral College preserves federalism and geographic balance but can produce outcomes that seem to contradict majority will.
Intermediate options like the NPVIC or proportional allocation may offer ways to mitigate the College’s most controversial effects without uprooting the constitutional framework but also face significant hurdles for implementation.
Whether reform happens will depend not just on the merits of the arguments, but on the political incentives of the states and the parties. Until those incentives shift, the Electoral College is likely to remain—imperfect, contentious, and uniquely American.